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ABSTRACT 
 
Countries at all stages of economic development desire economic growth. 
Hausmann et al. (2007) devises a theoretical model and empirical analysis purporting 
that the type of goods which a country produces, categorized by the wealth level of all 
countries producing such goods, serves as one determinant of economic growth. Given 
the importance of this finding, particularly for developing countries, and the broad 
range of technical capabilities which countries possess, this study seeks to determine if 
this relationship holds within productive categories, classified by the technological 
requirements of their production, or simply represents a movement from primary and 
resource-based products to higher level manufactures. In particular, this study 
analyzes the sophistication of exports in five categories; primary products, resource 
based products, as well as low, medium, and high-tech manufactures, correlating each 
countries level of sophistication in these categories with economic growth using both 
five and ten year panels over the period 1962-2000. The empirical analysis confirms 
the importance of sophistication in the low-tech sector, which includes textiles and 
basic metal manufacturing, as an indicator of economic growth in all countries, while 
suggesting that sophistication within the high-tech sector, comprised of 
pharmaceuticals, electronics, and aircraft equipment, plays a significant role in highly 
developed countries. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
I. Introduction 
In recent years a new literature has emerged, mostly from the work of 
Professors Rodrik and Hausmann at Harvard University as well as Professor Sanjaya 
Lall of Oxford University, which shifts the focus of growth studies away from 
endowments and institutions towards the composition of a country’s productive sector 
and the spillover effects of that particular composition. Rodrik and Hausmann assert 
that particular “discovery costs” are associated with moving production into new 
sectors and that these costs must be borne by the entrepreneurs who forge the paths 
away from traditional production (Rodrik & Hausmann, 2003). However, once a 
country has moved its production away from non-traditional sectors, it lowers the 
resultant discovery costs into similar sectors. Given that discovery costs are 
prohibitive, in their model, a role exists for government policies that reduce these costs 
encouraging exploratory movements into new types of production, eventually leading 
a country onto the path of the most advantageous production composition. 
In order to provide empirical analysis, Hausmann et al. (2007) appeal to the 
theories of comparative advantage in international trade using a country’s weighted 
value-shares of exports as a determinant of productive sector composition.  Though 
their model does not discuss exports directly, they assume that exports represent the 
most productive sectors of the economy, and thus serve as a proxy for overall 
productivity1. They create two variables PRODY, which associates each product with 
the GDP/capita of the countries that produce it, and EXPY, which totals the PRODY 
of each country’s trade basket2
                                                 
1In addition, export data is easily accessible and available for over 100 countries from 1962-2000. 
. Thus, the EXPY variable represents not only the 
2 These variables and their calculation are explained in more detail in the data section. 
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productive sector’s composition, but also the relative sophistication (as proxied by 
income level) of that composition. 
Though the EXPY variable is interesting in its own right (as later analysis will 
indicate) its greatest importance lies in its relation to economic growth, or GDP/capita 
increases over time. In order to determine this relationship Hausmann et al. (2007) 
regress economic growth on the EXPY variable and find a positive and significant 
relationship. In order to test the validity of these findings I have constructed my own 
PRODY and EXPY variables and will examine the relationship of these variables with 
GDP/capita growth over time. The authors’ use of weighted value shares of trade as 
their proxy for the composition of the productive sector creates a distinct possibility 
that the EXPY variable has a different impact on countries with different export 
compositions.  
 
II. Objective 
The results from Hausmann et al. (2007) focus on the overall sophistication of 
a country’s exports and its relation with growth. However, results from the original 
paper and my own analysis in Chapter 2 suggest that some countries such as Chile 
have low overall sophistication levels, but periods of high growth. Moreover, given 
Chile’s export focus on primary and resource based products compared with other 
high growth countries such as the United States, the question arises as to whether this 
export sophistication factor affecting growth stems from the entire range or merely a 
subset of a country’s production. The objective of this study is to revisit the results of 
Hausmann et al. (2007) and extend their work, examining the resilience of the impact 
of export sophistication on growth after disaggregating exports into sub-categories 
based on the technology involved in their production3
                                                 
3 The classification used in this paper was developed by Sanjaya Lall of Oxford University (Lall, 2000). 
.  
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III. Literature Review of Trade Complexity and Growth 
 In addition to more specific economic aspirations all countries desire economic 
growth. Gross domestic product per capita denotes the value of goods and services 
produced per member of the population and thus serves as a widely used measure of 
economic well-being. Economic growth, defined in this paper as an annual increase in 
GDP per capita, reflects an improvement in a country’s domestic production, 
providing the means for higher incomes, greater employment, and increased standards 
of living. Therefore, research on the relationship between economic growth and the 
productive sectors of the economy can provide policy makers with important 
information regarding those industries most likely to advance overall efficiency and 
stimulate economic growth. 
 However, two main policy approaches exist regarding the proper use of this 
information by governments. Lall (2004) describes the contrasting viewpoints of the 
neo-liberal and structuralist policy frameworks. Essentially neo-liberal policy, 
represented by the Washington Consensus, focuses on the ability of the market to 
reward successful industries and channel entrepreneurial capital and investment 
toward the most productive sectors of the economy, directing countries automatically 
toward those industries in which they can compete most efficiently within the world 
market. Hence, according to this view, governments simply need to establish the 
appropriate institutional framework, open their economies to world competition by 
relaxing international trade restrictions, and let the invisible hand guide resources 
towards their most efficient use. Meanwhile, the structuralist school suggests that 
governments play a more important role than simply maintaining macro-stability and 
supporting the rule of law. As Lall states, “the structuralist view puts less faith in free 
markets as the driver of dynamic competitiveness and more in the ability of 
governments to mount interventions effectively,” (Lall, 2004). However, significant 
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disagreement exists in the discussion as to which “interventions” are indeed most 
effective.  
A primary motivation for this structuralist policy emerges from empirical 
evidence in developing country growth experience. Rodrik (2003) and Lall (2000) cite 
a number of examples in recent economic history, including South Korea, Taiwan, and 
the performance of Latin America before and after Import Substitution 
Industrialization, that suggest that governments may indeed have a role to play in 
shaping the productive landscape of their economies and that this particular 
conglomeration of industries may impact the overall economic performance of a 
country. In the case of Latin America, an over-zealous approach to industrial policy 
with little regard to overall efficiency during the import substitution industrialization 
era caused the creation of poorly run state owned manufacturing enterprises which, 
protected by high tariff barriers, became inefficient. Following the Latin American 
debt crisis, the ensuing dependency of Latin American governments on funds from 
international organizations came with strict requirements to adhere to the neo-liberal 
policies on economic growth. However, as Rodrik and Hausmann (2003) mention, 
“Economic growth in the 1990s has been on average much lower than in the decades 
before 1980, even though the region was closed to trade and had poorer institutions by 
most benchmarks in the earlier period.” The authors contrast this unsuccessful 
restructuring of policies with the experience of the export-led growth of the Asian 
economies of South Korea and Taiwan, noting that the latter’s protective trade regimes 
and export subsidies managed to reward efficient industries leading to a competitive 
export sector and brought great success in economic growth though accompanied by 
policies unaccepted by the neo-classical approach. 
The underpinnings of the neo-classical approach, meanwhile relate to the 
traditional Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory which suggests that a country will specialize 
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in producing the things that require as inputs the factors of production in which it has 
an abundant natural endowment; labor or capital, in a simple two-factor model. A 
country can then trade what it produces with partners who have a different 
endowment, thus providing Ricardo’s benefits of comparative advantage, though in 
terms of factor endowments rather than productive technologies, to all trading 
partners. Any change then in the composition of production, a shift from agriculture to 
manufacturing for instance, results entirely from changes in the underlying factors of 
production caused by development, an accumulation of capital in the example of the 
shift from agriculture to manufacturing.  
However, this new body of literature, more in line with the structuralist policy 
framework, suggests that some additional learning must take place in order for a 
country to exploit fully its natural advantages. For instance, Lall (2000) criticizes the 
Heckscher-Olin model in favor of what he calls the capability approach suggesting 
that “comparative advantage depends more on the national ability to master and use 
technologies than on factor endowments in the usual sense.” Hence, he attributes the 
need for this new approach to the fact that current trade theories focus too heavily on 
the “capacity” rather than the “capability”, soft skills like management expertise, 
needed to shift production into new sectors (Lall, 2000). Essentially he asserts that 
structural transformations into new areas of production requires more than simply a 
change in factor endowments, but rather that efficiency in new sectors stems from 
having developed the skills needed to implement new technologies. If one can 
consider the temporary efficiency losses from this capability skill-set deficit as an 
adjustment cost for moving into new sectors, then Krugman (1991) derives a 
theoretical model that supports Lall’s argument. Krugman (1991) finds that in the face 
of  high adjustment costs, the historical structure of an economy ultimately determines 
its industrial sectors.   
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One also finds support for this proposition in economic history, for example in 
the case of Korea, which we discussed earlier with regard to its success in developing 
several high technology industrial sectors. Korea’s ability to develop these industries 
did not simply stem from its capacity to import foreign technologies; “it is a striking 
fact that formal purchase of technology in complete packages through such means as 
turnkey plant contracts and licensing…accounts for only a modest share of the 
technology that has been mastered in Korea” (Evenson & Westphal, 1995). Evenson 
and Westphal (1995), precursors to Lall’s strain of argument, highlight three necessary 
components for maximum efficiency in new industries; competent labor trained in 
similar industries, experimentation in particular adaptations of technology to local 
conditions, and an understanding of the most efficient combinations of available 
technologies. These characteristics then reflect a country’s “capability” in becoming 
competitive in new industries and obviously require considerable learning. Rodrik and 
his co-authors take this argument one step further, discussing the causality between 
shifts in production composition and economic growth, suggesting that encouraging 
the development of these soft skills necessary for a structural shift in fact causes 
economic growth by providing the “capability” for expansion in a range of new 
activities (Rodrik & Hausmann, 2003). 
 One explanation of this causal link comes more from empirics than theory. 
Contrary to Ricardo’s ideas of comparative advantage and specialization, Imbs and 
Wacziarg (2003) present empirical findings of a U-shaped relationship between sector 
concentration and economic development, suggesting that poor countries first 
diversify their productive capacities before specializing in areas of greatest advantage  
Moreover, the turn from diversification to specialization occurs quite late in the 
development process, suggesting that until countries are relatively wealthy they 
expand their production into new sectors rather than specialize. Rodrik (2008), in his 
 7 
 
book chapter on industrial policy sums up these findings suggesting that “the first 
order of business in development is to learn how to do new things, not to focus on 
what one already does well.” 
Additional empirical evidence exists regarding the importance of expanding 
one’s export basket. Hummel and Klenow (2005) also find that while larger countries, 
in terms of population, produce a wider variety of exports, for richer countries this 
increase lies more in the extensive margin than intensive margin. Hence wealthier 
countries produce exports in a wider array of industries than their poorer counterparts. 
In addition, a recent paper by Saviotti and Frenken (2008) finds there to be an 
immediate correlation between increasing export variety in related products and 
economic growth. Meanwhile, they find the same relationship examining increased 
export variety in different sectors, but only after a time lag, suggesting that recouping 
the investment of a shift in production processes may take time. These empirical 
findings emphasize that a benefit exists for diversifying ones productive sectors.  
 Rodrik and Hausmann (2003) call this process of diversification in the early 
stages of development, a period of “economic self discovery.” This process of 
economic self-discovery requires forging into new sectors of production, ignoring the 
traditional areas of comparative advantage, seemingly defying the previously held 
theories of specialization and comparative advantage. However, the authors of this 
body of literature avoid departing from these theoretical foundations of international 
economics, rather they augment the economic theory with the case of market failures, 
in this case, the failure of the market to adequately encourage exploration for new 
areas of comparative advantage. This market failure occurs because the societal 
benefits of exploratory entrepreneurship, discovering the productive sectors in which 
the economy has a competitive advantage, exceed the private benefits. Hence, the 
economic returns from entry into the new sectors fail to provide an adequate incentive 
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for exploration, particularly in developing countries, where, with less stringent 
intellectual property rights, competitors quickly erode profits in the new sector by 
emulating the first to arrive. Through this model of cost discovery and the market 
failure that ensues, Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) develop a framework that links 
increased export diversification with economic growth and hence provides a policy 
justification for encouraging production in new sectors.  
However, later work by the same authors suggests that countries should focus 
not just on diversification, but rather diversification into products most likely to lead 
to future growth. Both Hausmann et al. (2007) and Lall (2005) develop a 
sophistication index which they use to rank products by the wealth  level of the 
countries that export them4
                                                 
4 This recent work by Lall and Hausmann et al. (2007) draws heavily from an earlier body of literature 
on technology spillovers and learning by doing. Stokey (1988) develops a theoretical model for one 
economy in which learning by doing in the production of succeedingly higher quality products plays a 
crucial role in growth. Young (1991) and Matsuyama (1992) consider an international trade model 
between developed and developing countries and find a motivation for trade protection in developing 
countries in order to ensure the production of higher quality goods and consequently, the benefits of 
“learning by doing.” However, their models provide no measure of product quality and thus no method 
of empirically testing the relationship between product quality and growth. 
. According to Lall (2005), these product rankings then 
reflect the unique skills and capabilities possessed by richer countries; the 
“characteristics that allow high wage producers to compete in world markets.”  
Though several of these characteristics cannot be imitated such as location of natural 
resources and proximity to large markets, countries can work to increase their 
technological aptitude. Lall (2005) describes this as “the ability to handle technologies 
efficiently (production capabilities) and improve them over time (minor innovation), 
realize scale and agglomeration economies, and organize suppliers efficiently.” Hence, 
encouraging the production of higher ranked goods should lead countries to develop 
the skills which their production embodies and can be easily transferred to new 
technologies. Hausmann et al. (2007) take a slightly different approach in their use of 
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the sophistication index, relating more to their original framework of cost discovery. 
They assume that more sophisticated products must reflect more productive 
technology and hence a country’s adoption of these products increases its 
entrepreneurs’ incentives to search for yet more efficient technologies leading to an 
increase in overall productivity and growth. 
Hausmann together with other co-authors provides yet another avenue from 
which to address this issue of path-dependent productivity growth (Hidalgo et al. 
2007). Through an extension to the varieties and quality ladders models the authors 
construct a measure they call product proximity, the probability that a country with a 
revealed comparative advantage in one good also has a revealed comparative 
advantage in another good. Similar to Lall’s capability discussion, they assume that 
the efficient production of one good inevitably requires particular natural endowments, 
infrastructure, support industry networks, institutions, and human expertise that may 
be readily applied to the production of similar goods. Hence, once a country has 
developed the framework necessary to be competitive in one industry, it has already 
gained a significant advantage in moving into related industries. Using their product 
proximity measure, the authors construct a product space displaying the likelihood of 
moving within products as the geographic distance between them. The resulting 
network of industry clusters suggests that, as one might expect, higher level 
manufacturing industries such as automobiles and electronics have a number of 
branches connecting them to other lucrative industries. Thus, their analysis pinpoints 
another justification for encouraging the development of particular industries; in this 
case, those from which most other industries may easily be reached. 
These various approaches to the debate on industrial policy and economic 
growth suggest there exist a number of factors, including both empirical evidence and 
theoretical propositions, which suggest that a country’s particular industrial 
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composition plays an important role in it’s a ability to grow over time. Though 
previous experiences with industrial policy have had their drawbacks, the current 
literature seems to condone at least some level of policy intervention to channel 
investment into new and more productive sectors. While this paper follows the 
empirical approach of Hausmann et al. (2007) in measuring the sophistication of a 
country’s exports, it draws on this entire body of literature for its motivation in 
examining the impact of trade composition on future economic growth. 
The rest of this thesis is organized in three chapters. In Chapter 2 we revisit the 
empirical work of Hausmann et al. (2007) motivating the need for further investigation 
as to how this relationship between export sophistication and growth varies among 
different product categories. Chapter 3 provides further analysis, disaggregating the 
EXPYA variable into sectors by technology level, looking for trends among these 
sector sophistication scores over time, and examining their relationship with growth. 
Finally, we conclude our work with some final comments regarding this study in 
Chapter 4. Overall, we find that only sophistication in the low-tech category appears to 
be a robustly significant determinant of economic growth in a wide range of countries, 
suggesting that Hausmann et al.’s (2007) results may pertain to only a subset of 
industrial sectors, and may be dependent on a country’s current level of development. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
I. Introduction 
 As opposed to the assumption that economic efficiency increases and growth 
stem from the adoption of new technologies, endogenous growth models suggest that 
spillover effects from learning how to produce higher quality goods may be a driver of 
growth. Work by Stokey (1988), Young (1991), and Matsuyama (1992), provide 
theoretical models that support this view, but no empirical analysis. In the 2007 paper, 
“What you export matters,” Hausmann et al. develop a model of a similar nature to the 
previous endogenous growth literature, however, using exports as a proxy for the 
overall industrial structure they present a measure of product quality that allows for 
empirical testing. In their analysis they find export sophistication to be a robust 
determinant of economic growth. However, their study does not address whether this 
sophistication/growth relationship occurs within product categories or simply reflects 
a movement from agricultural and primary product production to higher level 
manufacturing.  
This chapter examines Hausmann et al.’s (2007) index and verifies their original 
panel growth regressions using a broader set of observations. The objective of the 
chapter is to investigate the construction of the EXPY and PRODY variables, 
measures of a country’s export sophistication and a good’s product sophistication. 
Though Lall (2005) constructs a similar methodology to ascertain export 
sophistication, current literature makes use of the Hausmann et al. (2007) index, so 
this paper focuses on their specific construction. In addition, we seek to examine 
export sophistication in countries with a focus on primary and resource-based goods. 
Given that developing countries are most in need of strategies for improving economic 
growth and the importance that agriculture and primary products play in the export 
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baskets of most developing countries, more information regarding the relationship 
between export sophistication and agricultural and primary product producers would 
be most interesting.  
Our results present similar conclusions with the previous literature regarding the 
relationship between export sophistication and growth. We find export sophistication 
in both five and ten-year panels from 1962 – 2000 to be a robust and significant 
determinant of economic growth. In both pooled and panel regressions our results 
reiterate the previous findings suggesting that indeed the kinds of products a country 
exports do have some influence on its overall growth potential. However, we find that 
some fast growing primary and resource product exporters have very low 
sophistication scores, leading us to question if sophistication within product categories 
is reflected in this index, and if that type of sophistication is also a determinant of 
economic growth. These questions, which this aggregated measure of export 
sophistication fails to address, provide the motivation for our analysis in Chapter 3. 
 
 
 
                  
     
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 – The product space; Source: Hausmann et al. (2007) 
 
 
 
 
0 h α*θmax 
 
θmax 
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II. θMax and the Product Space 
 Essentially, Hausmann et al. (2007) consider a production space represented in 
Figure 2.1 above. In this production space an investor chooses between investing in 
the traditional sector or in the modern sector. The productivity of investments in the 
modern sector, θ, ranges from 0 to h, where h represents an index of human capital, 
such that the maximum productivity of an investment is only constrained by the 
maximum level of human capital in the economy, one could consider this the 
maximum capability in the economy according to Lall’s approach. Furthermore, 
imposing the previously mentioned framework of cost discovery, some θmax exists, 
which represents the highest level of productivity currently discovered in the economy 
and only increases as more entrepreneurs invest in new projects discovering the 
productivity of new sectors. Meanwhile, information spillovers allow for the 
dissemination of the particular location of θmax, such that subsequent entrants in the 
modern sector know that, subject to some discount factor for late entry, α, they will be 
able to achieve the productivity of θmax producing at productivity level α*θmax. Hence, 
information spillovers provide an economy of scale such that, any increase in θmax 
leads to increases in α*θmax which in turn increases the expected profits of these 
entrepreneurs, who know that after risking an investment in a new sector, if their 
investment proves less productive than α*θmax, they can always emulate the other 
investors in the second period abandoning their own sector. Thus, any increase in θmax 
necessarily causes an increase in productivity and hence economic growth5
 
. 
 
                                                 
5 This entire theoretical framework follows directly from Hausmann et al. (2007), “What you export 
matters,” the contribution of this paper lies in the deconstruction of their sophistication index by sector. 
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III. Construction of EXPY Variable/Data 
 According to this theoretical framework, given some measure of θmax, or the 
productivity level of the economy, empirical analysis should suggest that rises in θmax 
are correlated with increases in growth. Thus, completing the empirical analysis 
requires some measure of economy-wide productivity. Using the method of Hausmann 
et al. (2007) we consider a country’s export basket as a fair representation of their 
overall productivity, assuming that a country exports only those goods in which it has 
the highest levels of productivity, and we correlate a particular level of sophistication 
to that trade basket by associating each product in it with the per capita GDP of the 
countries that produce it. The data for the analysis comes from the World Trade Flows 
dataset of imports and exports generated by Feenstra et al. (2005) and supported by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research, which covers 1962-2000, and the Penn World 
Tables created by Heston et al. (2002), which provide per capita GDP over the same 
period.  
  Country k’s export basket X, is comprised of i goods, such that the total export 
basket is equivalent to equation (2.1). Then xki/Xk represents the value share of each 
commodity i, where i refers to the 4-digit commodity code used in the World Trade 
Flows dataset. Thus, PRODYi associates the weighted value share of each commodity 
in a country’s trade basket with that country’s per capita GDP, see equation (2.2). The 
value share of each commodity is divided by the total value share of all other countries 
that produce this product, thereby if product i represents lower value shares in other 
countries, then country k’s per capita GDP is weighted heavier in the construction of 
PRODYi.6
                                                 
6 This weighting by revealed comparative advantage distinguishes Hausmann et al.’s (2007) trade 
complexity variable from previous models. 
 Finally, we construct country k’s level of complexity by summing the 
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PRODY levels over all i goods, which the country produces, weighted by its value 
share for that particular product, see equation (2.3)7
 
. 
(2.1)  
 
(2.2)   
 
(2.3)   
 Thus, constructing these variables for each year is fairly straightforward. 
However, when examining product sophistication over our entire 39-year panel, a 
number of possible methods of construction present themselves. In this study we 
analyze three different measures of product sophistication over time. The most 
obvious allows the PRODY product sophistication measure to vary each year simply 
creating a variable following the method described above. However, one might also 
assume that while the sophistication index of products should be allowed to vary 
overtime there perhaps exists value in maintaining some consistency of such rankings. 
One could argue that forcing our index to have this memory would be crucial if we 
suppose that each year’s sophistication index reflects more the current stage of 
development across all countries, rather than a wholly revamped technology structure. 
In order to incorporate this sophistication memory we also construct a PRODY index 
averaged over five-year intervals and a PRODY index that reports the average 
sophistication indices over the entire range of observations. In addition, given 
                                                 
7 It may be noted that by construction per capita GDP is related to EXPY, and since both variables are 
used to explain growth, particular attention is paid to the issue of multi-collinearity. However, the VIF 
for both variables shows no cause for concern. 
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somewhat disconcerting rankings in the sophistication levels of countries during the 
1970’s (high oil prices caused oil rich countries to appear as the most sophisticated 
exporters), we have also constructed an index which does not include this time period.  
The estimation portion examines our regression results using each of these different 
indices.  
 In addition to these various PRODY constructions, there also exists a 
methodological issue in determining which countries to include in the overall 
construction of our sophistication variables. Hausmann et al. (2007) stress in their 
paper the possible bias that might appear in the production index if countries are 
included in its construction only in a limited number of years. Due to the particular 
method of constructing PRODY and the fact that most countries for which data does 
not exist over the entire period belong to the developing country category and hence 
will have lower GDP/capita, including these countries in some but not all years will 
introduce a degree of bias into the sophistication measure. Table A.1 in Appendix A 
lists all countries that have some missing observations and the number of years for 
which the data is available. Though including these countries in some but not all years, 
will undoubtedly impact the final sophistication index, because they are mostly 
developing countries, including them also provides a much richer understanding of the 
sophistication process, and hence we proceed with our analysis using all countries and 
years for which data exists. However, final results excluding these countries have been 
calculated and we present them in the final chapter for comparison. 
 The importance of measuring the complexity of trade and the relative 
simplicity of constructing the variables used by Hausmann et al. (2007) lend these 
measures to a multitude of analysis, some with significant policy implications. Rodrik 
has cited these variables in a series of his papers, and particularly notes their 
importance for China in his recent publication, “What’s so special about China’s 
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exports”. He asserts that China’s growth stems from its production of highly 
sophisticated products, and thus its EXPY variable is much higher than those of 
country’s with similar or higher per capita GDP levels, for example several Latin 
American countries. Indeed, other economists have apparently found validity in these 
statistics as their use as a measure of the complexity of trade has moved beyond the 
growth literature. Recently, Gaofeng Han and Bin Xu use the PRODY of textile 
exports from China to measure the effect of the multi-fiber agreement on the 
complexity of traded textiles.  
However, some dissidents argue that these indices have limitations. Masanaga 
Kumakura (2007) purports some mathematical inconsistencies with the measure 
beyond the scope of our current analysis and suggests, as I believe Hausmann et al. 
(2007) would also admit, that the EXPY variable provides no measure of discounting 
a country if its quest for heightened complexity causes it to transform structurally 
beyond its most productive levels, hence causing inefficient deployment of resources. 
For example, returning to our discussion of Import Substitution Industrialization, in 
the height of ISI Latin American countries perhaps forced their complexity beyond 
their most productive levels. However, regarding EXPY, no maximum based on 
relative productivity exists, in effect, the higher the better. Noting these possible 
inadequacies, EXPY remains the most accepted measure of complexity to date, so we 
proceed with our analysis. However, our addition to this index, deconstructing it into 
industrial sectors and examining its relation to growth, which we discuss in Chapter 3, 
provides an attempt to address this issue of ascertaining to what EXPY level a country 
should strive. We do this through growth regressions by income groups and find that 
indeed, the most beneficial level of EXPY may vary based on a country’s current level 
of development. 
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IV. Model and Empirical Analysis 
The theoretical model developed by Hausmann et al. (2007) considers growth, 
or percentage change in per capita GDP, as some function of human capital, hc, and 
the discovered level of productivity, θmax 8
 
. Though not explicitly developed in this 
particular theoretical model, it seems reasonable to assert that because we consider 
percentage changes in growth, the base from which we derive that percentage change 
likely plays some role in its determination (e.g. larger economies must undergo 
significant increases in production to achieve large percentage growth). Thus, we 
include initial per capita GDP in our growth function.  
(2.4) Growth = f(hc, θmax, GDP0) 
 
Assuming a linear relationship and taking the logarithm of the dependent variables we 
arrive at our simple regression model, where Y represents percentage change in per 
capita GDP.  
 
(2.5) Y = α + β1 log(θmax) + β2 log(hc) +  β3 log(GDP0) 
 
For our particular model we define human capital as the average years of 
schooling for everyone in the population above 159
                                                 
8 All per capita GDP figures used are in constant prices. 
. The source for our human capital 
measure comes from Barro and Lee’s 2000 study on educational attainment.  
Meanwhile, we will use our constructed variable EXPY to represent θmax because we 
assume that a more sophisticated compilation of exports represents an economy’s push 
9 Data is also available for human capital above age 25. We present results using both data sets, 
however, given little difference between the results and the greater number of observations available for 
the HC15 variable, our final regressions present only the results from this HC15 variable. 
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toward more “cost discovery” and thus higher productivity. Again per capita GDP 
figures come from the Penn World Tables. Our theoretical model suggests that 
increases in both EXPY and human capital should increase our annual percentage 
growth, while increases in initial per capita GDP likely cause percentage growth to 
decrease. 
In their econometric analysis, Hausmann et al. (2007), include time dummies 
in each of their growth regressions. This makes sense considering the great number of 
external factors affecting overall GDP growth in any given year, particularly global 
bust and boom cycles. Moreover, an F-test confirms their pertinence so we include 
them in our analysis. Additional tests, including a goodness of fit test using adjusted R 
squared and Bayesian and Akaike Information Criteria for the possible inclusion of 
quadratic terms for human capital and EXPY as well as interactions among human 
capital, GDP/capita, and our sophistication variables suggested that these were 
unnecessary modifications. The details of these tests can be found in Appendix C. See 
below the final model for estimation, where δ represents the coefficient on the time 
dummy, d represents the dummy variable for each period, and a dummy for the first 
period has been excluded to avoid multi-collinearity or a “dummy trap”. Thus, the 
constant term can be interpreted as the specific slope for the first period with each 
respective δ adjusting the slopes of later periods. 
 
(2.6)  Y = α + β1 log(θmax) + β2 log(hc) +  β3 log(GDP0) + δ2 d2 (1965) + δ3 d3 (1970) 
+ δ4 d4 (1975) + δ5 d5 (1980) + δ6 d6 (1985) + δ7 d7(1985) + δ8 d8(1990) + δ9 d9 (1995) + 
δ9 d9 (2000) 
 
The compiled dataset considers per capita GDP growth over five and ten year 
intervals from 1962-2000. Thus, the data includes panels with nine and five separate 
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periods of per capita GDP growth for 110 different countries, which when combined 
with available human capital data and our constructed EXPY variable yields 858 
complete observations10
 
. Tables 1 and 2 below report the summary statistics of our 
variables used in the regression analysis. Unfortunately, our dataset is not balanced 
such that we do not have all 9 observations for each country. The limited data on 
human capital greatly restricts our usable observations. Estimation includes pooled 
OLS as well as fixed and random effects from panel regressions. However, our tests 
and corrections for violations of classical assumptions focus on the pooled model. 
 
Table 2.1 - Summary Statistics, 5-year panels 
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
expya 1150 6458.385 2670.559 1881.666 12809.03 
gdpg5a 1150 .0205624 .0440044 -.27722 .519675 
gdpc 1150 7285.319 8206.361 170.55 67188.32 
HC15 858 5.101235 2.851997 .12 12.05 
HC25 782 4.881816 2.959061 .04 12.25 
 
 
Table 2.2 - Summary statistics, 10-year panels 
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
expya 640 6510.377 2664.482 1881.666 12809.03 
gdpg10a 640 .0203096 .0331785 -.1508 .2449556 
gdpc 640 7432.422 8489.345 359.15 66762.66 
HC15 477 5.142201 2.887093 .12 12.05 
HC25 401 5.044489 3.004123 .04 12.25 
 
 Tests for violation of the OLS assumptions of multi-collinearity, normality, 
heteroskedasticity, and autocorrelation revealed heteroskedasticity to be our only 
violation. Thus, we have reported our White’s robust standard errors in all estimations, 
                                                 
10 Our inclusion of 106 countries differs this study from the original work by Hausmann et al. (2007) 
which considers only 97 countries and 604 observations. 
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giving us inefficient but consistent estimators. Due to our time component in the panel 
regressions, we also consider the possible case of non-stationarity, which would cause 
inconsistency in our estimators and result in a spurious regression. Though we might 
expect per capita GDP to consistently drift upwards over time, our cross-sectional data 
provides enough variation that we have stationary data in all dependent and 
independent variables. See Appendix C for the details of these tests. 
 
V.  Estimation 
 The estimation of our model has been completed using Stata version 9.1. Table 
2.3 shows the pooled model regression results using 110 countries and all 858 
complete observations11. The signs on our variables reflect economic intuition for the 
most part. Given our logarithmic transformation of the dependent variables we can 
interpret unit changes (percentage points since we measure growth) in per capita GDP 
growth in terms of percentage changes in our dependent variables. Therefore, we find 
that a 10% increase in human capital, raising the average years of schooling of the 
above 15 population, enhances growth by about one-tenth of a percentage point in the 
pooled model.  However, in the fixed-effects model, we find a negative, though 
insignificant, effect on human capital, which runs counter to economic intuition. 
However, this variable appeared very sensitive in the original regressions on trade and 
complexity in Hausmann et al. (2007) as well12
                                                 
11 Tables A.1, A.2 in the appendix list the countries, with and without full sets of observations, used in 
this study. 
. Meanwhile, higher initial per capita 
GDP results in lower growth over the period. However, our constructed variable 
EXPYA provides the most interesting results, suggesting that a 10% increase in 
EXPYA increases growth by .10 to .19 percentage points depending on whether we 
12 The next section investigates the use of different panel regression methods and further discusses this 
human capital perplexity. 
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consider an overall cross-country pooled regression or a fixed-effects regression that 
allows for different effects within each country group. Thus, we have empirically 
proven our theoretical assumption that increasing the complexity of one’s trade, and 
hence boosting the “discovered” productivity level θmax does indeed increase growth.  
 
 
Table 2.3 – Export sophistication and growth, pooled and fixed-effects models 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
   Pooled-5 FE-5  Pooled-10 FE-10 
VARIABLES  gdpg5a gdpg5a gdpg10a gdpg10a 
     
lnexpya  0.0188*** 0.0158** 0.0151*** 0.0107 
   (0.00686) (0.00759) (0.00505) (0.00689) 
lnhc15   0.0115*** -0.00667 0.00975*** -0.0107* 
   (0.00248) (0.00545) (0.00249) (0.00605) 
lngdpc   -0.00889** -0.0282*** -0.00676*** -0.0230*** 
   (0.00357) (0.00914) (0.00259) (0.00472) 
Constant  -0.0630* 0.133*  -0.0501 0.135* 
   (0.0374) (0.0794) (0.0316) (0.0724) 
Observations  858  858  477  477 
R-squared  0.152  0.164  0.173  0.229 
Countries    110    109 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
Overall, our data shows very similar results to those available in the published 
literature. We see that our export sophistication variable appears significant above the 
5% level in each model specification except equation (4). The impact of this product 
sophistication ranges from 0.0107 to 0.0188 suggesting that a 10% increase in product 
sophistication correlates to above one-tenth of a percentage point increase in 
GDP/capita growth. Further evidence from panel regressions using only countries with 
consistent observations throughout the panel reports a growth impact near three-tenths 
of one percentage, suggesting that the estimates above may be conservative, see Table 
A.3 in the appendix. 
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VI.  Robustness and variable construction selection 
 A number of options exist regarding the choice of the appropriate base model 
for our inference on the effects of sophistication on economic growth. As discussed in 
Section III, we have constructed four different export sophistication variables, each 
based on a slightly different product sophistication ranking. In addition, we have some 
choice as to our measure of a country’s level of human capital as well as its five and 
ten-year rates of economic growth. Finally, though the structure of our dataset lends 
itself to panel form regression analysis, it requires some consideration to determine 
which method of analysis most accurately reflects the patterns between economic 
growth and export sophistication found in our data. Each of these various variables 
and configurations of our estimation have economic merit and deserve thoughtful 
selection. Hence, in this section we discern the best variables and regression 
techniques for use in our model among these various possibilities and consider the 
estimations from these various specifications as a robustness test for our underlying 
framework. 
Revisiting our previous discussion regarding the various methods of 
constructing the PRODY product sophistication index, we can analyze the results in 
Table 2.4 with respect to each of our different indices. EXPYA takes the average of 
the PRODY indices over the entire period, while EXPY allows the product 
sophistication to vary each year, and EXPY5A reflects a five-year moving average of 
the PRODY values. Finally, EXPYNOILA, represents an average product 
sophistication level excluding the period 1970-1981 during which oil producing 
countries appear as the most sophisticated exporters, perhaps skewing our results. 
Most importantly we note that all estimations maintain the significance of the EXPY 
measure and maintain the same sign and a similar magnitude. In addition, the use of 
the various indices does not appear to change the sign, significance, or magnitude of 
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any covariates. Hence, we defer to the previous literature which uses the overall 
average of product sophistication over the entire period (EXPYA) and follow suit in 
the remainder of this chapter and the next.  
 
 
Table 2.4 – Export sophistication and growth, PRODY index comparison 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Pooled-5 Pooled-5 Pooled-5 Pooled-5 
VARIABLES  gdpg5a gdpg5a gdpg5a gdpg5a  
     
lnexpya  0.0188***    
   (0.00686)  
lnhc15   0.0115*** 0.0115*** 0.0111*** 0.00550** 
   (0.00248) (0.00258) (0.00257) (0.00249) 
lngdpc   -0.00889** -0.00762** -0.00866** -0.00651*** 
   (0.00357) (0.00357) (0.00356) (0.00210)  
lnexpy     0.0129**   
     (0.00639)   
lnexpy5a      0.0166**  
       (0.00646)  
lnexpynoila        0.0160*** 
         (0.00463) 
Constant  -0.0630* -0.0149 -0.0360 -0.0719** 
   (0.0374) (0.0307) (0.0313) (0.0313) 
Observations  858  858  858  858 
R-squared  0.152  0.144  0.150  0.028 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
   
 In addition to examining these different sophistication measures, we have also 
considered possible variations in the measure of growth and the particular human 
capital variables used in our analysis. Table 2.5 below compares the original 
regression, reporting five-year growth as the average of growth for each of the five 
years and using human capital as the average years of schooling for the population 
over 15, with variations to these specifications. The second regression defines growth 
as the change in GDP/capita from the first year of each period to the fifth year with no 
 25 
 
consideration for variation within the period. The third regression replaces human 
capital above age 15 with an education measure for the population above 25, 
decreasing the observations from 858 to 782. Again, in both variations of our original 
equation we see no change in significance or sign and no major adjustment in 
magnitudes. However, using the overall five-year growth equation, we see a much 
higher impact from EXPYA, our country sophistication variable. This most likely 
reflects a smoothing of short periods of economic decline which may have existed 
within the five-year periods. Given the similarity in results we have chosen to focus 
our proceeding analysis on only the more detailed results, which includes the greater 
number of observations.  
 
 
Table 2.5 – Export sophistication and growth, human capital/growth comparison 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
   Pooled-5 Pooled-5 Pooled-5 
VARIABLES  gdpg5a gdpg5  gdpg5a 
    
lnexpya  0.0188*** 0.0260*** 0.0198*** 
   (0.00686) (0.00733) (0.00768) 
lnhc15   0.0115*** 0.0150***  
   (0.00248) (0.00290)  
lngdpc   -0.00889** -0.0143*** -0.00926** 
   (0.00357) (0.00432) (0.00403) 
lnhc25       0.0109*** 
       (0.00240) 
Constant  -0.0630* -0.0850** -0.0701* 
   (0.0374) (0.0376) (0.0416) 
Observations  858  857  782 
R-squared  0.152  0.136  0.144 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 2.6 – Export sophistication and growth, five/ten year panel regressions  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
RE-5  FE-5  RE-10  FE-10 
VARIABLES  gdpg5a gdpg5a gdpg10a gdpg10a  
     
lnexpya  0.0265*** 0.0158** 0.0160*** 0.0107 
   (0.00756) (0.00758) (0.00516) (0.00689) 
lnhc15   0.0152*** -0.00667 0.00865*** -0.0107* 
   (0.00302) (0.00545) (0.00290) (0.00605) 
lngdpc   -0.0148*** -0.0281*** -0.00713*** -0.0230*** 
   (0.00451) (0.00914) (0.00272) (0.00472) 
Constant  -0.0852** 0.1329* -0.0545 0.135* 
   (0.0386) (0.0794) (0.0344) (0.0724) 
Observations  858  858  477  477 
Countries  110  110  109  109 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Next we consider different panel models with which to analyze our data. Table 
2.6 above displays both fixed and random-effects regressions for our five and ten-year 
panels. The fixed-effects estimation for our model effectively includes dummy 
variables for each country in the dataset. This allows for individual country variability, 
such that the coefficient on EXPYA now explains the effect of complexity on growth 
net of effects specific to certain countries. Again, following our earlier finding of 
heteroskedasticity we report White’s robust standard errors. Allowing for these fixed 
group effects, we find that our key variable, EXPYA, remains significant and of a 
similar magnitude in both the random and fixed-effects regressions, giving us a 
robustness check on our estimation13
The Hausmann specification test suggests that a systematic difference exists 
between the random and fixed-effects models, which implies that the fixed-effects 
estimator is consistent, and the random-effects model is not. Unfortunately, in the 
.  
                                                 
13 The expya variable in regression (4) is significant at the 12% level, and is indeed significant at the 
10% level if we use the 10-year whole period growth rate, rather the yearly average. 
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fixed-effects regressions human capital not only loses its significance but also changes 
sign, contrary to economic intuition. The human capital variable also loses its 
significance in the fixed-effects estimation in the published literature, but maintains its 
sign. Though the random-effects regression returns a “nicer” result, it seems difficult 
to argue that we should assume the unobserved factors impacting our growth 
regressions are not correlated to specific country panels, as the random-effects 
regression requires. Many attempts have been made to address this negative human 
capital coefficient, including a quadratic term and possible interaction terms, as well 
as a reduction of all countries without a full set of observations. However, even in our 
smallest model, we still include over 100 observations in excess of those used in the 
previous literature. Moreover, additional regressions run on subsets of the 
observations based on income levels, suggest that the sign of this human capital 
variable is quite sensitive to adjustments in the collection of observations. Given the 
sensitivity of this variable, the greater number of observations we employ, the findings 
of our specification test, and the methodology used in previous literature, we 
concentrate our panel analysis on the fixed-effects model. 
Given the results of these various model specifications we consider the pooled 
ordinary least squares and fixed-effects panel regressions with five and ten-year 
growth panels as our base-line estimations. We include the HC15, EXPYA, and 
GDP/capita independent variables in this base model as well as our dependent variable 
of GDP/capita growth averaged per year. This estimation serves as our baseline model 
in Chapter 3 as well, though modified to include disaggregated EXPYA variables. 
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VI. Motivation for further analysis 
 Our empirical analysis has confirmed the earlier findings of Hausmann et al. 
(2007) on the impact of the complexity of trade on economic growth. Enlarging their 
study by more than 10 countries and 100 observations we also conclude that a 
country’s increase in the complexity of the goods they export results in higher 
economic growth. This finding is robust in both magnitude and significance to both a 
pooled OLS model and a fixed-effects panel model. These results suggest that 
countries have justification in promoting policies that encourage production 
diversification, particularly subsidizing new entrants and encouraging 
entrepreneurship if such actions will increase the “cost discovery” process and 
ultimately lead to a higher θmax. 
 The authors of the original study purported that “a country’s fundamentals 
generally allow it to produce more sophisticated goods than it currently produces”, 
making this process both vital and feasible (Hausmann et al., 2007). However the 
obvious question remains, even if a country is able to produce more sophisticated 
goods that it currently does, what level of sophisticated goods will bring the maximum 
benefits? Obviously, in the case of Latin America and Import Substitution 
Industrialization, the ability to produce more sophisticated goods existed, but the 
resulting industries proved inefficient and overall benefits to growth never 
materialized. Hence, even if agreement regarding the need for industrial policy did 
exist among development economists, which it does not, individual country policy 
makers would still benefit from greater knowledge of those industries most likely to 
bring about economic growth given their own current state of technological 
capabilities. 
 Unfortunately, the information presented thus far does not clearly elucidate a 
particular pattern between different sectors and economic growth. Though we find a 
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robust relationship between export sophistication and growth, this information does 
not tell us which of these sophisticated products have the greatest impact on economic 
performance. Regarding product sophistication, is a higher value always better or 
could certain products or sectors encompass a greater number of the benefits 
mentioned in the motivation for this study? 
For instance consider primary and resource based product clusters. Given the 
construction of our EXPY and PRODY variables, we know that products exported by 
wealthier countries will get higher sophistication scores. This implies that even 
primary and resource based products exported by wealthy agricultural and resource 
rich countries such as the United States, Canada, and Australia will have relatively 
high scores. However, two difficulties arise regarding their inclusion in our previously 
discussed framework explaining the benefits that accompany product sophistication. 
First, though wealthier countries may employ higher level production techniques, in 
commodities our index will be unable to distinguish between different production 
methods. For instance, the United States, Mexico, and Malawi all produce corn, yet 
the methods and technologies employed in each country’s production differ greatly, 
making it difficult to assume that our index could capture the overall sophistication 
embodied in corn production. Second, even if the index did capture a movement 
toward a more sophisticated agricultural industry one might question the “spillover” 
benefits to higher level manufacturing.  
However, manufacturing industries slightly upstream from primary products, 
such as food processing, while not as technology intensive as computer chip 
production would require a set of skills applicable to other industries. Moreover, such 
movements upstream could be captured by our index if wealthier countries produce 
relatively more of these slightly-manufactured resource based goods. This type of 
resource-based manufacturing represents nearly 20% of Chile’s exports, the country 
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with the best growth record in Latin America since the 1970’s, leading one to question 
the importance of these sectors in relation to economic growth. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 - % Trade in primary/resource products 
 
It appears that among at least some countries considerable variation occurs 
regarding sophistication and a country’s main export sectors. Figure 2.2 shows that 
among the particular countries examined, primary and resource based products 
composed at least 50% of trade at the beginning of our panel. However, apart from 
Chile, New Zealand, and Australia, each of these countries has significantly reduced 
their exports of such goods, with China and South Korea showing drastic reductions. 
Yet, Figure 2.3 shows that the relationship between exports of primary/resource based 
goods and export sophistication is not clear. We see that some of our major 
primary/resource exporters such as New Zealand and Australia, have very high 
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sophistication levels throughout the period. Meanwhile, Chile, which also exports 
mostly from these sectors, has the lowest overall sophistication score, though it 
steadily increases. This mixed response is also evident in our larger dataset. Figure B.1 
in Appendix B shows a scatter plot between sophistication and percentage trade in 
primary and resource based products for all our observations. It shows an inverse 
pattern, but with a great number of outliers. Interestingly, however, the major rise in 
export sophistication for China, which occurs after 1980, and Korea, which occurs 
over the whole period, coincide with their dramatic declines in exports from these 
primary sectors. Though exports of resource based goods allows for high 
sophistication scores, perhaps major growth in sophistication and subsequent 
economic growth requires movement into higher level manufacturing sectors. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 – Overall export sophistication 
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Figure 2.4 – Economic Growth, 5-Year Average 
 
Moreover, an examination of Figure 2.4 reveals that these same countries with 
varying export patterns and varying sophistication levels also have widely variant 
growth patterns. Since 1980, the three countries from this group with the strongest 
growth performance have been China, South Korea, and Chile, countries at opposite 
ends of the sophistication spectrum. These results elicit two questions regarding the 
preceding discussion on sophistication and growth. Primarily we need to investigate if 
these outliers represent an actual trend in the larger data, suggesting that export 
sophistication at any level can lead to economic growth, as depicted from the Chilean 
experience. If indeed, export sophistication across a broad range of sectors can lead to 
economic growth, the next question one should ask is whether a country’s current 
level of sophistication matters in determining which product areas are most beneficial 
in achieving this growth. An analogy perhaps helps clarify this proposition. Consider 
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all countries on a ladder of development on which a higher position implies higher 
product sophistication. Should a country’s current rung on the development ladder 
affect the benefits that accrue from reaching for higher rungs? Does every country 
benefit from reaching for the top or are intermediate steps crucial along the climb? 
These questions obviously have enormous policy impacts and are of a rather ambitious 
nature; however, in the next chapter we use our compiled dataset and an export 
classification system devised by Sanjaya Lall to shed at least some light on this 
daunting subject matter within the framework of our current study.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
I.  Introduction 
Hausmann et al. (2007) examine the impact of product sophistication, proxied 
by exports, on economic growth. They find a positive, significant, and robust 
relationship. However, increasing one’s overall product sophistication can be achieved 
through the production of a range of goods from low technology resource based 
products to electronics and pharmaceuticals. Given the great variation in expense and 
difficulty associated with transferring from one’s current production to these various 
industries, additional analysis regarding the effect of sophistication within particular 
product sectors on economic growth would be most enlightening. Moreover, the 
countries most in need of sound strategies for achieving economic growth are also 
those most likely to have difficulty quickly transitioning their industrial sectors into 
the production of new goods, and hence could benefit most from knowledge of the 
sectors with the most significant relationship with growth.   
The objective of this chapter is to extend the work of Hausmann et al. (2007) 
creating an export sophistication product ranking within five product categories. The 
categorization we use comes from Lall (2000). Our particular contribution to this body 
of knowledge is the development and analysis of a number of methods for determining 
sector sophistication. Selecting the best of these methods we investigate the top ranked 
countries and products in each of our export categories, examining what particular 
factors drive our sophistication ranking. We then use these country sophistication 
scores to discover the relationship between economic growth and sophistication within 
product sectors. Finally, we attempt to deduce the impact of a country’s current level 
of development (proxied by income, and HDI rankings) on this relationship between 
sector sophistication and growth. 
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Unfortunately, the resource-based manufacturing success in Chile and its 
subsequent economic growth that motivated much of this discussion appears to be a 
unique case. Indeed, neither sophistication in the primary nor resource-based sectors 
has a significant relationship with growth for countries in any income range. However, 
focusing one’s exports on the low-tech sector, which includes textiles, garments, and 
basic metal manufacturing, seems to be beneficial for countries in a wide range of 
development. Though the magnitude of its effect is not great, export sophistication in 
the low-tech sector has a very significant and robust relationship with economic 
growth. Finally, as one might expect, for the 20 wealthiest countries in the world, the 
only significant growth benefit found from export sophistication comes from the high-
tech sector, including the most advanced electronics, pharmaceuticals, and aviation 
equipment. 
 
 
II.  Productive Sector Classification 
 A number of ways exist in which to divide a country’s outputs into productive 
sectors. A recent paper by Kaplinsky and Paulino presents a concise table listing 
nearly twenty different published classifications, the main criteria used in each paper, 
and whether that criteria is analytical or based on personal judgement. The criteria 
range from readily observed components such as factor-intensities and the type of 
product produced, to more abstract notions such as the processes involved in 
production, innovations in the those processes, research and development norms in the 
industry, and necessary skills. The authors identify three types of sector classification 
“those focusing on product characteristics (income elasticity, for example), those on 
factor content (notably capital and labour intensity), and those targeted at innovation 
intensity” (Kaplinsky & Paulino, Innovation and Competitiveness: Trends in Unit 
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Prices in Global Trade, 2005). The paper itself attempts to examine innovation within 
sectors by measuring the unit-price of outputs in those sectors. 
 Recall that the theoretical model which motivates our empirical work suggests 
that searches for more productive industries and the spillover effects, in terms of 
process knowledge and technology expertise, which arise from developing those more 
productive industries, drive the relationship between export sophistication and growth. 
Hence, for the purpose of this study sector classifications based on innovation seem 
most applicable. Among those classifications, we have chosen to use Sanjaya Lall’s 
particular methodology described in, The Technological Structure and Performance of 
Developing Country Manufactured Exports, 1985-1998. We have chosen this 
particular classification both because the author’s views on the capability approach 
motivated this study and should inform any classification we use and since he draws 
distinctions based on SITC three digit product codes his ranking is easily configured to 
our own dataset14
 
. 
Table 3.1 – Lall’s sector classfication            
1) Primary products  
2) Resource based manufactures 
a) Agro/forest based products 
b) Other resource based products 
3) Low technology manufactures 
a) Textile/fashion cluster 
b) Simple medal production 
4) Medium technology manufactures 
a) Automotive products 
b) Medium technology process industries 
c) Medium technology engineering industries 
5) High technology manufactures 
a) Electronics and electrical products 
b) Aircrafts and pharmaceuticals 
                                                 
14 For a comprehensive listing of the products included in each category see (Lall, 2000). 
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 Lall’s classification, which we describe in Table 3.1 above, attempts to divide 
products by the technological process involved in their production and the skills 
necessary to efficiently carry out this process. Hence goods in the first category, 
primary products, require very little manufacturing and a country’s comparative 
advantage in their production normally depends on natural endowments. As one 
proceeds up the sector rankings, the production process becomes more skill and 
technology intense forcing countries to have a higher level of “capability” in order to 
be competitive in producing such goods. If product sophistication does involve the use 
of higher level skills and technology intensive processes, as we claim it does, then the 
PRODY sophistication index should increase with succeeding sector classifications. 
Figure 3.1 shows precisely this. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 – Sector PRODY average values 
1962 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
pprody 3598.18 4101.06 4858.36 6095.57 6996.2 7303.34 6348.64 8503.7 8657.15
rbprody 4632.49 5135.11 6507.7 7401.43 8887.7 9279.94 8850.72 11025.4 11878.8
ltprody 5083.08 5520.59 6562.26 7119.69 8736.42 9059.89 8807.16 10514.1 10602.4
mtprody 5911.55 6729.36 8199.16 10197 12927.4 10869.1 11110.7 13725.5 14476.8
htprody 6662.86 7175.87 9785.91 10659.7 11891.3 11380.1 12197 14254.2 16258.3
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 We can see that though some overlap exists, products associated with higher 
technology sectors in Lall’s classification have higher product sophistication scores on 
average. Figure 3.1 reports the average of all product sophistication scores within each 
category for each five-year period. Recall that for the purposes of our regressions we 
use product sophistication scores averaged over the entire 39 year panel, however, this 
graph shows that the correlation between Lall’s sectors and our sophistication index 
holds throughout the sample. Closer examination reveals that while a clear distinction 
exists between primary products and the two middle sectors, and between the middle 
sectors and the top sectors, significant overlap occurs among the low-tech and 
resource based categories and the medium/high-tech categories. Our product 
sophistication scores would suggest that these overlapping sectors embody very 
similar technological processes. 
 
 
III. Export Sophistication by Sector 
 In order to analyze export sophistication within sectors modifications must be 
made to the original EXPY indices. The product sophistication variable, which ranks 
goods according to the wealth of the countries that export them, remains unchanged in 
our sector analysis. However, as depicted in equation (2.1), the sophistication level of 
sector j in country k essentially takes a partial sum of the original EXPY variable for 
all i goods in sector j. Each sector’s sophistication level comprises a sum of the 
sophistication of all products exported by a particular country in that sector weighted 
by the percentage of the country’s overall trade which each product represents.  
 
(2.1)   
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(2.2)    
 
 Weighting products by their sophistication score undoubtedly makes this 
measure reflect increased product sophistication within sectors. However, because this 
sector EXPY is a partial sum weighted by a country’s own value share, which must 
sum to one over all products, shifting ones trade into new sectors will automatically 
increase sophistication within that sector. Hence, this index reflects both a quality and 
quantity measure. Seeking an index based purely on sophistication we also devised a 
methodology weighting product sophistication levels by value shares within only that 
sector rather than overall value shares, see equation (2.2). This, in essence, weights the 
sophistication level of each product in a country’s sector sophistication score by the 
percentage of a country’s trade represented by that product within only that particular 
sector. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 below show the top ten countries by high-tech export 
sophistication rank using the two different methods. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 – Top ten countries by high-tech sector sophistication, methodology 1 
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Figure 3.3 – Top ten countries by high-tech sector sophistication, methodology 2 
 
 Using overall value shares as our weight seems to reflect a better overall 
measure of product sophistication comparing Figures 3.2 and 3.3. We can see that 
using this method, export sophistication in the high technology sector is indeed highly 
correlated with a country’s percentage trade in that sector. However, Figure 3.2 
displays countries’ sophistication rank using both indices and shows that the countries 
receiving top scores when weighted by overall value shares also have high levels of 
sophistication when weighted by within sector value shares. The converse does not 
appear to be true as show in Figure 3.3. None of the leading countries ranked by the 
second methodology have high scores in the first ranking, and only three of the top 
countries export more than 2% of their overall trade in the high technology sector. It is 
unlikely that such a small percentage of a country’s overall export sector would 
embody the spill-over benefits and productivity gains that we seek to reflect in this 
ranking. However it is important to note that some discrepancies with common notions 
of export sophistication still exist when using overall value shares, such as the 
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Philippines higher ranking than the United States. Again, this is because our ranking 
inevitably rewards countries with exports concentrated in particular sectors. Despite 
these limitations weighting by overall value shares best captures the measure of 
sophistication pertinent to this particular study. The creation of a more precise 
measure of sector sophistication could be the topic of future research15
  
. 
 
IV.  Analysis of Country and Product Sophistication by Sectors 
 Now that we have identified a particular methodology for ascertaining 
sophistication within productive sectors, this section examines those products and 
countries with the highest sophistication rankings looking for patterns overtime.  In 
order to illustrate the manner in which products receive their scores, we examine the 
top and bottom five products within the primary product sector. Figure 3.4 shows that 
a great deal of variation exists between the highest and lowest ranked products in this 
sector. Table 3.2 sheds some light on this variation showing the five top exporters, by 
weighted value shares or revealed comparative advantage, for the highest and lowest 
ranked products, a special type of wheat and shellac. The first column shows each 
country’s weighted value share in each product. Given the method for determining 
product sophistication, each country’s weighted value share is multiplied by its 
GDP/capita to produce the PREPRODY value, which summed together give the 
product its overall sophistication level. A quick glance at table 3.2 reveals that the 
production of goods with extreme sophistication values is concentrated in either 
wealthy or poor countries.  
 
                                                 
15  An additional attempt to combine both methodologies consisted of re-weighting the expy values 
constructed using the second methodology by overall value shares. This resulted in a slightly different 
ranking scheme, but a similar relationship between sector sophistication and growth. 
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Figure 3.4 – Highest/lowest ranked goods by sophistication, primary products 
 
Table 3.2 – Components of sophistication for primary products 
 Country  WVS PREPRODY  PRODY  
WHEAT  United States .0597758 1721.714 19679.67 
 France .0703783 1518.517 19679.67 
 Argentina .0760705 834.4725 19679.67 
 Canada .110547 2446.757 19679.67 
 Australia .4514494 9923.915 19679.67 
 
 
    
SHELLAC  Senegal .0292799 46.00949 1005.653 
 Ethiopia .0345958 25.09475 1005.653 
 Sudan .088462 92.68247 1005.653 
 Somalia .1075862 73.33397 1005.653 
 Chad .68514 568.3304 1005.653 
 
 As discussed previously it is not immediately evident that production of certain 
types of wheat or rapeseed, the highest ranked products in the primary sector, 
necessarily requires more skills and abilities to efficiently employ technologies than 
the production of shellac or tea leaves. However, analysis of tables A.4 – A.7 in 
Appendix A reveals some differences between the types of products ranked at the top 
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and bottom of the sophistication index for the resource based through high-tech 
sectors. Thorough analysis of these different product categories obviously requires 
knowledge of the industrial processes used in their production, an endeavor beyond 
the scope or expertise of this study. Moreover, our aggregation to the four digit 
product level, a condition of our dataset, does not allow for a precise investigation of 
particular products.  
However, in light of these difficulties we recall that our sector sophistication 
variable reflects both increases in the quantity and quality of goods produced in a 
given sector, as will be made apparent in the next section. Given the overall upward 
trend in sophistication as one moves to higher level sectors, this quantity component 
also provides an indication of the precise level of overall sophistication a country has 
achieved, as countries can increase their sophistication by producing either more 
sophisticated goods within a category or by producing goods in a higher level 
category. When we address the growth regressions in the final section of this chapter, 
we will revisit this idea, interpreting our estimation results as a combination of within 
and between sector sophistication. 
 Having considered how the products achieve their various rankings, we now 
examine countries’ sophistication within product sectors. Beginning again with the 
primary products sector in 1962, the first year for which we have available data, 
Figure 3.5 displays the five countries with the lowest and highest sophistication scores 
in this sector. As previously mentioned, our sector sophistication index combines both 
a quantity and quality dimension so the following figure presents a number of 
measures that attempt to highlight these various components. PEXPYA is our sector 
sophistication variable, represented by the blue bar graph. Clearly, there exists 
significant variation of primary product sophistication among the countries in our 
study, with the bottom five countries receiving a score near zero. Ptrade represents 
 44 
 
percentage of overall trade in primary products for each country, in other words it 
depicts the importance of primary products in a country’s export regime. Meanwhile, 
PEXPYA2 denotes each country’s export sophistication score using within sector 
value shares, removing the “quantity” metric from our index. In addition, the 
PEXPYA2 averaged over all countries in our sample is also depicted on the graph as a 
base for comparison.  
 
 
Figure 3.5 – Highest/lowest ranked countries by primary product sophistication 
As expected, quantity clearly plays a role in our index such that the top five 
countries each have over 60% of their trade in primary products. However, they also 
produce more sophisticated products relative to the average, as indicated by their 
PEXPYA2 values. Recall that PEXPYA2 weights the sophistication of products in 
each country’s primary sector by the sector value shares, rather than overall value 
shares. This allows for countries such as Japan, which has less than 5% of its overall 
trade in the primary sector, to receive a relatively high sophistication score in 
PEXPYA2. However, in our index Japan has one of the lowest overall primary sector 
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sophistication scores precisely because it exports so few of these products. Therefore, 
our index reports a combination of these factors, such that for a country to receive a 
high sophistication score in any one sector, that sector must be important in the 
country’s overall trade basket and the country must produce more sophisticated 
products from within that sector. 
 
 
Figure 3.6 – Top ten exports by value, New Zealand, 1962 
An analysis of New Zealand’s top ten exports in the primary product sector 
confirms our suppositions regarding the requirements for a high sector sophistication 
score in our index. Figure 3.6 depicts the ten goods that represent the greatest portion 
of New Zealand’s trade in 1962, as represented by the own value share line (ovs). 
Interestingly, the products for which New Zealand’s exports represent a large portion 
of the world’s exports, are also those products with the highest PRODYA or product 
sophistication scores. Thus, New Zealand’s rank as the most sophisticated exporter of 
primary products reflects both its concentration of exports in primary products and the 
high sophistication rank associated with the products of which it is a relatively large 
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world exporter. Similar patterns exist with respect to the remaining four sectors, which 
appear as Figures B.3-A.9 in the appendix. 
 We can also examine our sophistication ranking by income groups over the 
forty-year period in search of trends by sector. Given what we have shown our index 
to represent, we can interpret these trends as a measure of the importance of each 
sector in the three income groups we consider as well as a measure of the 
sophistication of the products within those groups. Figures 3.7 – 3.11 show the 
average country sophistication score for each sector divided into three categories by 
GDP/capita values. Ranking 1 refers to the third of the countries in our sample with 
the lowest GDP/capita values. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show that little has changed in the 
overall sophistication of the primary and resource-based categories, as one might 
expect, but the distribution of the sophistication in primary products has transferred 
from the rich countries (group 3) to the poorer countries (group 1). This suggests that 
wealthier countries have switched the focus of their exports away from primary 
products to higher level sectors, which is precisely what Figures 3.10 and 3.11 show. 
In the medium and high-tech sectors, the wealthiest third of our sample has seen an 
enormous surge in product sophistication over the past forty years, while the middle 
third shows some gains, and the bottom third nearly none. However, in the low-tech 
sector, a most interesting pattern emerges in which the wealthy countries first rise and 
then fall in product sophistication, while closely followed and eventually overcome by 
the middle-income group. The lowest ranked countries by GDP/capita also see 
substantial gains in this low-tech sector, suggesting that this level of sophistication 
represents an achievable step on the development ladder, and as later regressions 
show, perhaps a very worthwhile step in terms of growth. 
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Figure 3.7 – Primary sector sophistication, by GDP/capita group 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8 – Resource-based sector sophistication, by GDP/capita group 
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Figure 3.9 – Low-tech sector sophistication, by GDP/capita group 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10 – Medium-tech sector sophistication, by GDP/capita group 
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Figure 3.11 – High-tech sector sophistication, by GDP/capita group 
 
Having analyzed our sector sophistication index for trends in our overall 
sample we now return to the original set of countries that motivated this section. 
Figures 3.12-3.13 below show that Chile’s sophistication in the primary and resource 
based sectors, unique from the group, increased over our sample period. As expected 
this reflects both a continued reliance for Chile on copper exports, but also a buildup 
in manufactured food and beverage products. However, Figures 3.14-3.16 display a 
very distinct pattern in the quickly growing economies of South Korea and China. 
South Korea develops a very sophisticated low-tech industry during the 60’s and 70’s 
followed by a gradual and then steep decline. China’s exports show a similar patter, 
but begin their increase about ten years later than those of its South Korean neighbor. 
Meanwhile, the rest of the countries in our sample show little change in their low-tech 
sectors. In the medium-tech sector we see both countries again developing more 
sophisticated industries, but nearly ten years after their respective build-ups in the low-
tech sector.  This step-by-step process to higher levels of sophistication completes 
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itself in Figure 3.16 where South Korea and China both show significant increases in 
their high-tech sophistication scores, at least five years following their rise in the 
medium-tech sector. 
These country-specific patterns present two questions, which we will address 
in the final section on growth regressions. Specifically, they again bring into question 
whether or not primary and resource-based sector sophistication can indeed stimulate 
growth overall, at least as evident by our collection of data. In addition, they urge one 
to consider the possibility that a country’s current level of development affects the 
level to which it can successfully increase its product sophistication. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.12 – Primary sector sophistication, 1962-2000, select countries 
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Figure 3.13 – Resource-based sector sophistication, 1962-2000, select countries 
 
 
Figure 3.14 – Low-tech sector sophistication, 1962-2000, select countries 
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Figure 3.15 – Medium-tech sector sophistication, 1962-2000, select countries 
 
 
Figure 3.16 – High-tech sector sophistication, 1962-2000, select countries 
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IV.  Model Specification 
 We again appeal to Hausmann et al.’s (2007) “What you export matters” for 
the theoretical underpinnings of our econometric model. Drawing from a larger 
literature on technology spillovers and learning by doing, the basis for their model is 
that perfect knowledge regarding the efficiency of industrial processes can only be 
known after they have been implemented. In their paper they discuss the dynamic 
process that occurs as an economy invests in a search for more productive sectors, 
whereby as higher productivity industries emerge they generate greater expected 
profits for successive waves of entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs, stimulated by the 
prospects of higher returns, then continue to invest in new sectors revealing yet more 
competitive industries, only constrained by the overall human skill level in the 
economy. 
 Therefore, their model sees growth as a function of human capital, the level of 
currently discovered production (EXPY), and GDP/capita, as seen below. 
 
(3.1) Growth = f(hc, EXPY, GDP0) 
 
Our model, then, disaggregates the level of currently discovered production into five 
unique components, yielding a growth function as follows: 
 
(3.2) Growth = f(hc, Primary EXPY, Resource-Based EXPY, Low-Tech EXPY, 
Med-Tech EXPY, High-Tech EXPY, GDP0) 
 
 In order to test this relationship empirically we assume a linear relationship 
and take the logarithm of the independent variables, arriving at the following equation, 
where the dependent variable is percentage change in GDP/capita over the period: 
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(3.3)  Y = α + β1 log(PEXPYA) + β2 log(RBEXPYA) +  β3 log(LTEXPYA) +   
β4 log(MTEXPYA) + β5 log(HTEXPYA) + β6 log(hc15) + β7 log(GPD0) 
 
As before, we define human capital as the average years of schooling for 
everyone in the population above 1516
As stated previously, in their econometric analysis, Hausmann et al. (2007), 
include time dummies in each of their growth regressions. This makes sense 
considering the great number of external factors affecting overall GDP growth in any 
given year, particularly global bust and boom cycles. Moreover, an F-test confirms 
their pertinence so we include them in our analysis. Additional tests, including a 
goodness of fit test using adjusted R squared and Bayesian and Akaike Information 
Criteria for the possible inclusion of quadratic terms for human capital and sector 
sophistication variables as well as interactions among human capital and GDP/capita 
suggested that these were unnecessary modifications. See Appendix C for details of 
these tests. See below the final model for estimation, where δ represents the 
coefficient on the time dummy, d represents the dummy variable for each period, and 
a dummy for the first period has been excluded to avoid multi-collinearity or a 
“dummy trap”. Additional tests for normality, non-stationarity, heteroskedasticity, and 
. The source for our human capital measure 
comes from Barro and Lee’s 2000 study on educational attainment.  Again per capita 
GDP figures come from the Penn World Tables. Our theoretical model suggests that 
increases in any of the EXPY variables and human capital should increase our annual 
percentage growth, while increases in initial per capita GDP likely cause percentage 
growth to decrease. 
                                                 
16 Once again, data is available for the average years of education for population over 25, however, 
there are fewer observations and no theoretical reasoning for the choice of 25 over 15. 
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serial-correlation have been completed and suggest heteroskedasticity to be the only 
problem. Hence in the proceeding section estimation results are reported with White’s 
robust standard error to ensure consistent estimators. Again, details of these tests can 
be found in Appendix C. 
 
(3.4)  Y = α + β1 log(PEXPYA) + β2 log(RBEXPYA) +  β3 log(LTEXPYA) +   
β4 log(MTEXPYA) + β5 log(HTEXPYA) + β6 log(hc15) + β7 log(GPD0) 
+ δ2 d2 (1965) + δ3 d3 (1970) + δ4 d4 (1975) + δ5 d5 (1980) + δ6 d6 (1985) + δ7 d7(1985) + 
δ8 d8(1990) + δ9 d9 (1995) + δ10 d10 (2000) 
 
V. Sector Sophistication and Economic Growth 
All regressions have been estimated using Stata version 9.1. Table 3.3 shows 
the summary statistics for all the variables used in the regressions that follow. Some 
countries in our sample do not have exports in every sector throughout the panel, 
which results in non-uniform observations. As one would expect, the highest number 
of observations occur in the primary products sectors with the lowest occurring in the 
med-tech and high-tech sectors. 
 
Table 3.3 – Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Pexpya 1149 2317.398 2066.499 9.388059 8843.282 
RBexpya 1119 1688.626 1410.479 2.947257 9176.173 
LTexpya 1079 997.4322 1229.359 0.510171 7031.683 
MTexpya 974 1144.056 1497.221 2.74711 8346.855 
HTexpya 1027 558.2066 1079.568 0.421322 8696.062 
HC15 858 5.101235 2.851997 0.12 12.05 
gdpc 1150 7285.319 8206.361 170.55 67188.32 
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Table 3.4 – Export sophistication by sector and growth 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Pooled - 5 Fixed - 5 Pooled-10 Fixed - 10 
VARIABLES  gdpg5a gdpg5a gdpg10a gdpg10a  
     
lnhc15   0.00828*** -0.0153** 0.00751*** -0.0176** 
   (0.00296) (0.00671) (0.00285) (0.00696) 
lngdpc   -0.00561* -0.0129 -0.00687*** -0.0204*** 
   (0.00311) (0.00900) (0.00224) (0.00455) 
lnPexpya  -6.89e-05 0.00196 -0.000375 -0.000272 
   (0.00169) (0.00407) (0.00129) (0.00304) 
lnRBexpya  0.00224 0.00174 0.00305 -0.000360 
   (0.00173) (0.00317) (0.00206) (0.00281) 
lnLTexpya  0.00612*** 0.00549** 0.00447*** 0.00307** 
   (0.00211) (0.00219) (0.00134) (0.00151) 
lnMTexpya  -0.00379 -0.00184 -0.00119 0.00101 
   (0.00289) (0.00265) (0.00147) (0.00247) 
lnHTexpya  0.00265* 0.00188 0.00185 0.00130 
   (0.00146) (0.00149) (0.00122) (0.00138) 
Constant  0.0383  0.109  0.0407* 0.200*** 
   (0.0318) (0.104) (0.0227) (0.0581) 
Observations  730  730  413  413 
R-squared  0.209  0.185  0.256  0.303 
Countries    107    106 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Table 3.4 shows our initial growth regression comparing pooled ordinary least 
squares and fixed-effects panel regressions for both five and ten year panels. Similar 
to our analysis in chapter 2 we find a negative ` effect from increases in initial 
GDP/capita and a positive impact from human capital in the pooled model. However, 
in the fixed-effects model, which allows for different effects within each country the 
human capital variable turns negative, suggesting that its strong positive relationship 
with growth may only exist in a subset of the countries in our sample. Regarding our 
sophistication variables, it appears that only the low-tech sector has a robustly 
significant relationship with growth evident in each of the four model specifications. 
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While the magnitude of this effect, 0.003-0.006, represents only a fraction of the 
positive significant relationship we found with overall product sophistication in 
Chapter 2, its robustness within these four regressions as well as several others in the 
proceeding analysis, serves as an important indicator of its impact on growth.  
Following our theoretical approach of cost discovery, this would suggest that 
the discovery of higher productivity industries in the low-tech sector does indeed 
begin a dynamic process of investment in new technologies that leads to higher 
economic growth. Meanwhile, when applied to the technology spillover literature 
these results imply that the development of the skills and expertise necessary for 
success in the low-tech sector provides a platform for continued growth in pursuits 
with higher levels of sophistication both within the low-tech category and beyond.  
However, it may be that this relationship between sector sophistication and 
growth depends on one’s current level of development, as we proposed previously. 
Hence, we test this proposition in a number of different ways. All regressions for this 
analysis appear in Appendix A. First, we divide our sample of countries into three 
groups based on their human development index rankings, which considers a number 
of factors including life-expectancy, literacy, and sanitation. This provides us with one 
measure of development; however, because the rankings have not been in existence 
throughout the whole period covered by this study, the latest rankings are used 
throughout the panel. The index is unique in that it places such weight on the health, 
education, and life-expectancy scores that some relatively poor countries appear in the 
top groups. Our regression results show that dividing the sample into these subgroups 
causes the low-tech sector to lose its significance in all but the highest ranked group, 
indicating that this positive relationship between LTEXPYA and growth requires a 
minimum level of development. 
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Considering the possibility that a country’s wealth may be more important in 
establishing the thresholds for sector sophistication capabilities we next examine these 
growth regressions by income level. Again the sample of countries has been split into 
three different categories with separate regressions run in each group. Interestingly, for 
the group with the highest per capita incomes, a group of the 20 most highly 
industrialized countries ($31,000 – 20,000), the significance of the low-tech sector 
sophistication in determining growth disappears. Instead, the high-tech sector, 
composed of the most sophisticated products overall, such as electronics, 
pharmaceuticals, and aircrafts, appears significant in each of the four model 
specifications. Throughout the five and ten year regressions with pooled OLS and 
fixed –effects, a 10% sophistication increase in the high-tech sector increases 
GDP/capita by between .5 and 1.4 tenths of a percentage point. This confirms our 
earlier suspicions that the main benefits of reaching for the highest levels of 
sophistication accrue to a very wealthy subset of countries. Meanwhile, sophistication 
in lower end sectors appears futile for this rich group. This result is particularly 
interesting given that Hausmann et al. (2007) found that increases in overall product 
sophistication has no significant affect in OECD countries. Thus, the growth impact 
from product sophistication must be highly concentrated in the high-tech sector. 
However, the low-tech sector continues to play a positive and significant role 
in both the pooled and fixed-effects models for five and ten-year panels in the 
remaining income categories. Appendix tables A.10 and A.11 show that as the income 
level falls the lower level sophistication sector that includes textiles and basic metal 
production again has a significant and robust relationship with GDP/capita. This sector 
has obviously played an important role in economic development over the years. In 
their paper on the importance of discovering production efficiencies through practice, 
Rodrik and Hausmann (2003) discuss the spreading of textile industries in 
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industrializing countries from early developers such as Britain, the United States, and 
Japan to later emerging economies such as China, Taiwan, and South Korea. Recall 
that our index captures both quality and quantity increases in export production, 
implying from our regression results that both a shift in manufacturing focus towards 
this sector, as well as investments in higher level product lines within the sector can 
lead to economic growth. 
 The possibility does exist that our measure of sector sophistication may be 
skewed by the inclusion of observations from countries with incomplete data over the 
entire panel. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Hausmann et al. (2007) suggest 
that an unbiased estimate for product sophistication and thus overall country 
sophistication requires using only countries with a consistent set of observations, 
particularly since those countries missing observations likely come from the lower end 
of the development spectrum. Additional regressions have been computed using only 
such countries and are found in Appendix A. However, one should note that the 
effects of this change are not only in the countries included in the regressions, but also 
in how the product sophistication scores are constructed. The results also show the 
low-tech sector to be important, but not at the same level of robustness. 
Our original model purports the use of exports in the construction of our 
sophistication variables because exports should represent the most productive 
industries in any economy. However, imports also represent special characteristics in 
an economy. They denote those goods which a country does not have a comparative 
advantage in producing and/or which it requires as inputs for its own manufacturing 
purposes. Using the same reasoning as in our previous discussion the imports of 
wealthier countries then, should represent both those products in which low cost 
competition quickly erodes profitability and those that are essential in the manufacture 
of products that require such a high level set of skills that countries with low labor 
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costs cannot easily imitate their production. Reconstructing our dataset weighting 
countries’ sophistication by imports rather than exports and again running growth 
regressions we find that importing the same goods that rich countries import has the 
most robust and significant impact on growth in the high-tech sector. This suggests 
that a country’s imports may serve as a good indicator of its economic growth 
potential. Table 3.5 shows our regression results using imports. 
 
 
Table 3.5 – Import sophistication by sector and growth 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Pooled-5 FE-5  Pooled-10 FE-10 
VARIABLES  gdpg5a gdpg5a gdpg10a gdpg10a 
 
lnhc15   0.0116*** -0.00602 0.00915*** -0.00907* 
   (0.00270) (0.00564) (0.00256) (0.00500) 
lngdpc   -0.00644** -0.0294*** -0.00587*** -0.0249*** 
   (0.00267) (0.00797) (0.00186) (0.00471) 
lnPexpya  0.00690* 0.00299 0.00680*** 0.000863 
   (0.00363) (0.00418) (0.00215) (0.00262) 
lnRBexpya  0.000587 -0.00236 0.0103*** 0.00893* 
   (0.00705) (0.00873) (0.00396) (0.00468) 
lnLTexpya  -0.000918 0.00107 -9.43e-05 0.00116 
   (0.00551) (0.00566) (0.00257) (0.00333) 
lnMTexpya  -0.00671 -0.00301 -0.00194 -0.00236 
   (0.00436) (0.00626) (0.00479) (0.00585) 
lnHTexpya  0.00883* 0.00896** 0.00717*** 0.00659** 
   (0.00535) (0.00411) (0.00239) (0.00321) 
Constant  0.0303  0.235  -0.0738  0.143* 
   (0.128) (0.172) (0.0638) (0.0847)  
Observations  852  852  473  473 
R-squared  0.171  0.165  0.208  0.243 
Countries    110    109 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 3.6 – Export sector sophistication and growth, using import PRODY 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Pooled-5 FE-5  Pooled-10 FE-10 
VARIABLES  gdpg5a gdpg5a gdpg10a gdpg10 
 
lnhc15   0.00893*** -0.0144** 0.00804*** -0.0173*** 
   (0.00293) (0.00673) (0.00265) (0.00579) 
lngdpc   -0.00550* -0.0123 -0.00651*** -0.0203*** 
   (0.00324) (0.00916) (0.00190) (0.00456) 
lnPexpya  -0.000680 0.00344 -0.00134 -0.000238 
   (0.00206) (0.00431) (0.00136) (0.00265) 
lnRBexpya  0.00152 0.00189 0.00207 0.000526 
   (0.00171) (0.00322) (0.00147) (0.00259) 
lnLTexpya  0.00533*** 0.00481** 0.00395*** 0.00279* 
   (0.00184) (0.00194) (0.000922) (0.00148) 
lnMTexpya  -0.00262 -0.00124 -0.000416 0.00112 
   (0.00248) (0.00236) (0.00119) (0.00179) 
lnHTexpya  0.00245* 0.00240* 0.00161 0.00137 
   (0.00139) (0.00145) (0.000989) (0.00129) 
 
Constant  .0461  0.0883  0.0526** 0.194*** 
   (0.0417) (0.112) (0.0228) (0.0534)  
Observations  730  730  413  413 
R-squared  0.209  0.186  0.260  0.304 
Number of ecode   107    106 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
However, developing countries in particular may also be interested in the types 
of goods imported by wealthy countries, merely for the sake of ensuring greater 
demand by countries most able to afford their goods. Focusing on increasing the 
production of those products desired by the wealthiest countries could then also lead to 
economic growth. In order to analyze this possibility we have also reconstructed our 
sophistication index, by first ranking products by the wealth of the countries that 
import them. Thus in Table 3.6, we create our PRODY variable based on imports. We 
then use these PRODY values to rank what a country exports in the same manner used 
previously and regress this new export sophistication variable against economic 
growth. This regression shows that exporting goods in the low-tech sector, which 
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wealthy countries import has a robust and significant relationship with economic 
growth, of nearly the same magnitude as our original sophistication-growth 
relationship. Though this is analysis is preliminary it suggests that our original 
theoretical model may need some modifications. Further research should investigate 
whether it is indeed the “cost discovery” process driving the relationship between low-
tech sector sophistication and growth or the fact that low-tech sector products have a 
large import market in wealthier countries. 
 Our disaggregation of the original EXPY variable into a sector-level 
sophistication index highlights a number of important findings. Though motivated by 
the anomalous behavior of some primary and resource producing countries, our 
estimations suggest that, at least in general, increasing the sophistication of products in 
those sectors has little impact on economic growth. Instead, the two extremes of the 
manufacturing sector, the low and high-tech product categories have the most robust 
and significant relationship with per capita GDP increases. However, only the 
wealthiest subset of countries benefit from increasing their high-tech sector 
sophistication while increases in the sophistication of the low-tech sector have a 
positive and significant impact on growth in countries with varying income levels. 
Therefore, while not proven necessary for economic growth, establishing industrial 
capabilities in the low-tech sector clearly involves some process that generates a 
dynamic effect on economic growth. Further analysis shows that the wealth level of 
the countries that import these products may also be a determining factor in their 
ability to stimulate growth. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
I. Conclusion 
 The great inequality in per capita wealth that exists throughout the world today 
inspires research aimed at understanding the drivers of economic growth. This study 
has attempted to extend previous research on the relationship between product 
sophistication and increases in GDP/capita using a panel data-set covering 39 years 
and over 100 countries. Drawing on development and growth literature regarding the 
importance of technology spillovers and the necessity of uncovering the productivity 
of various industries through trials and failures, we have established a motive for 
examining how the types of products that a country exports affect its growth. We then 
re-examined previous studies on this topic, validated their results, and through 
analyzing those results inspired the need for an investigation into the role that specific 
sectors play in this process of export sophistication led growth. 
 In “What you export matters,” Hausmann et al. (2007) developed a theoretical 
model based on the process of cost discovery in new industries. This model generated 
the idea for a variable they called EXPY, which reflects the overall productivity level 
of a country’s productive sectors. By using exports as a proxy for these productive 
sectors, this variable ranks a country’s level of productivity or sophistication by 
assigning a value to the goods in its export basket based on the wealth of all the 
countries that export those goods. We have recreated this variable using the same 
dataset and over 100 additional observations and after running a number of regressions 
using various methods of construction for the product and country sophistication 
indices, discovered the same positive, robustly significant relationship between a 
country’s product sophistication and its economic growth. However, examining a 
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number of special countries, both in terms of the types of products that they produce 
and the speed with which they have developed in recent years, we discovered that 
countries with an export focus in primary and resource based products received 
varying sophistication scores, and some had very high levels of growth. This prompted 
us to investigate if this relationship between sophistication and growth reflects merely 
a move from primary and resource-based production to the development of highly 
technical industries or if the sophistication of products within a particular sector also 
benefits overall growth. 
 In order to complete this analysis we created new sophistication variables, 
disaggregated into five sectors. The rubric for the classification of products into 
different sectors came from a paper by Sanjaya Lall that attempts to reflect the 
innovation and technological skills necessary for the production of a range of different 
goods. In his paper he discusses five different categories; primary products, resource-
based products, and low, medium, and high-tech manufactures. Using the same 
PRODY product sophistication index developed in our examination of Hausmann et 
al. (2007) we generated each country’s sector sophistication level by summing product 
sophistication scores by sector, which we then weighted by the percentage of overall 
trade represented by each product.  
 Using these newly created disaggregated sector sophistication variables we 
examined the product and country sophistication indices. The most sophisticated 
products in the primary category seemed to be driven somewhat artificially by being 
produced by only a small handful of wealthy countries. However, in the higher level 
sectors clear distinctions could be made between the top and bottom ranked products 
based on the types of processes their production likely involves. Additional analysis of 
the validity of these rankings could be the study of future research on industrial 
processes.  
 65 
 
Investigating the countries with the highest sophistication scores in each sector 
it became evident that a high ranking involves both a quantity and quality component. 
In order for a country to increase its sector sophistication score it either must produce 
more of the products that wealthier countries produce in that sector, or increase its 
concentration on products from that category among its overall export basket. 
Attempts to disentangle these separate factors revealed disconcerting rankings and the 
theoretical underpinnings of our investigation suggest that the growth benefits from 
increased product sophistication may also be enhanced by a “quantity” component. 
Thus, our regression analysis took place within the framework of both sector 
sophistication and concentration. We also re-examined our special group of countries 
and their sector sophistication scores, noting an obvious step-wise pattern in the 
sophistication of progressive sectors. 
 Finally, we examined the relationship between these sector sophistication 
variables and economic growth. We immediately discovered a robust and significant 
effect from the low-tech sector. Further analysis confirmed that sophistication within 
the high-tech sector benefitted only the wealthiest countries in the sample, while the 
low-tech sector seemed to provide a positive contribution to growth for all countries 
outside this wealthiest class. The primary, resource-based, and medium-tech sectors, 
however, never appeared as a significant determinant of economic growth in any of 
our various model specifications. Additional regressions using only those countries for 
which we have a complete set of observations confirmed our findings in the low-tech 
sector. Through recreating our product and sector sophistication variables using 
imports, we found that importing the same goods as wealthier countries also has a 
positive impact on growth, but only in the high-tech sector. As concluding analysis, 
we created a product sophistication score of imports with a country sophistication 
score of exports, thus ranking each country by the wealth of the nations that import its 
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goods. Growth regressions revealed that, at least in the low-tech sector, exporting 
more of the goods that wealthy countries import also increases economic growth.  
Thus, this study has confirmed that the composition of a country’s trade basket 
has an impact on its level of economic growth and it has identified two particular 
sectors that play important roles in producing this economic growth. However, it has 
also shown that a country’s level of wealth does affect the level of product 
sophistication which it can successfully achieve. Further research is needed on the 
correlation between our products’ sophistication ranks and the productive processes 
involved their production. In addition, preliminary analysis on an import 
sophistication variable has inspired investigation into how large a role import markets 
play in determining the growth benefits associated with increased production in more 
sophisticated industries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 67 
 
APPENDIX A 
Table A.1 – Countries with a full set of observations 
Countries 
Algeria Greece Norway 
Argentina Guatemala Oman 
Australia Guinea Pakistan 
Austria Honduras Panama 
Barbados Hong Kong Paraguay 
Belgium Iceland Peru 
Benin India Philippines 
Bolivia Indonesia Portugal 
Brazil Iran Romania 
Burkina Faso Iraq Rwanda 
Burundi Ireland Senegal 
Cameroon Israel Singapore 
Canada Italy South Africa 
Chad Jamaica Spain 
Chile Japan Sri Lanka 
China Jordan Sweden 
Colombia Kenya Switzerland 
Congo, Republic of Korea, Republic of Syria 
Costa Rica Madagascar Taiwan 
Cote d`Ivoire Malawi Tanzania 
Denmark Malaysia Thailand 
Dominican Republic Mali Togo 
Ecuador Mauritius Trinidad &Tobago 
Egypt Mexico Tunisia 
El Salvador Morocco Turkey 
Equatorial Guinea Mozambique Uganda 
Ethiopia Nepal United Kingdom 
Finland Netherlands United States 
France New Zealand Uruguay 
Gabon Nicaragua Venezuela 
Gambia, The Niger Zambia 
Ghana Nigeria Zimbabwe 
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Table A.2 – Countries with less than a full set of observations 
Countries, Number of years of available data 
Seychelles 1 Lebanon 10 Oman 31 
Guyana 1 Slovak Republic 10 Sierra Leone 31 
Libya 1 Yemen 10 Mauritania 31 
Angola 1 Albania 11 Korea, Dem. Rep. 31 
Armenia 6 Russia 11 Laos 31 
Belarus 6 Vietnam 12 Bahamas 31 
Azerbaijan 7 Germany 12 Cambodia 31 
Lithuania 8 Djibouti 22 Central African Republic 31 
Macedonia 8 Bangladesh 29 Congo, Dem. Rep. 31 
Kyrgyzstan 8 Cyprus 31 Bahrain 31 
Tajikistan 8 Sudan 31 Cuba 31 
Czech Republic 8 Macao 31 Poland 31 
Ukraine 8 Liberia 31 Hungary 31 
Turkmenistan 8 Mongolia 31 Haiti 31 
Kazakhstan 8 Belize 31 Qatar 31 
Latvia 8 Kuwait 31 Fiji 31 
Georgia 9 Afghanistan 31 Saudi Arabia 31 
Croatia 9 Netherlands Antilles 31 Suriname 31 
Slovenia 9 Malta 31 Iraq 31 
Uzbekistan 9 United Arab Emirates 31 Malawi 38 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
9 Samoa 31 Zimbabwe 38 
Estonia 9 Papua New Guinea 31 Rwanda 38 
Moldova 9 Bermuda 31   
Bulgaria 10 Somalia 31 Average Years 20.9 
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Table A.3 Export sophistication and growth, full observation countries only 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   Pooled-5 FE-5  Pooled-10 FE-10 
VARIABLES  gdpg5a gdpg5a gdpg10a gdpg10a 
     
lnexpya  0.0282*** 0.0168* 0.0228*** 0.00270 
   (0.00541) (0.00867) (0.00523) (0.00691) 
lnhc15   0.00945*** -0.00509 0.00738*** -0.00981 
   (0.00243) (0.00545) (0.00249) (0.00606) 
lngdpc   -0.0125*** -0.0232*** -0.00953*** -0.0197*** 
   (0.00250) (0.00569) (0.00254) (0.00472) 
Constant  -0.115*** 0.0843  -0.0932*** 0.178** 
   (0.0341) (0.0759) (0.0329) (0.0736) 
Observations  731  731  405  405 
R-squared  0.181  0.171  0.185  0.221 
Countries    84    84 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
 
Table A.4 – Highest/Lowest products by PRODYA, Primary 
Resource Based Top-Bottom Products PRODYA 
SISAL & OTHER FIBRES OF AGAVE FAMILY 996.8558 
JUTE & OTHER TEXTILE BAST 
FIBRES,NES,RAW/PROCESSED 
1344.527 
GROUNDNUT (PEANUT) OIL 1399.927 
TIN ORES AND CONCENTRATES 1890.289 
WAXES OF ANIMAL OR VEGETABLE ORIGIN 1900.643 
SYNTHETIC ORGANIC DYESTUFFS 15905.93 
BACON, HAM & OTHER DRIED,SALTED,SMOKED MEAT OF 
SWI. 
15938.57 
SYNTH.ORGANIC LUMINOPHORES;OPTIC.BLEACHING 
AGENTS 
16204.41 
NITROGEN-FUNCTION COMPOUNDS 16236.07 
PAPER & PAPERBOARD,IMPREGNAT.COAT.SURFACE-
COLOURE 
17250.6 
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Table A.5 – Highest/Lowest products by PRODYA, Low-Tech 
Low-Tech Top-Bottom Products PRODYA 
FABRICS,WOVEN,OF JUTE OR OF OTHER TEXTILE BAST FIB 1578.354 
CARPETS,CARPETING AND RUGS,KNOTTED 1896.866 
SACKS AND BAGS,OF TEXTILE MATERIALS 2642.696 
KELEM,SCHUMACKS AND KARAMANIE RUGS AND THE 
LIKE 
2643.926 
LEATHER OF OTHER HIDES OR SKINS 2826.17 
KNITTED/CROCHETED FABRICS ELASTIC OR RUBBERIZED 14610.52 
CARPETS,RUGS ETC.OF MAN-MADE TEXTILE MATERIALS 
NES 
14688.21 
ART.OF ELECTRIC LIGHTING OF MATERIALS OF DIV.58 15541 
YARN OF REGENERATED FIBRES,PUT UP FOR RETAIL SALE 15747.96 
ORTHOPAEDIC APPLIANCES,SURGICAL BELTS AND THE 
LIKE 
16134.39 
 
Table A.6 – Highest/Lowest products by PRODYA, Med-Tech 
Medium-Tech Top-Bottom Products PRODYA 
PIG IRON,CAST IRON AND SPIEGELEISEN,IN PIGS,BLOCKS 3694.512 
MINERAL OR CHEMICAL FERTILIZERS,PHOSPHATIC 4563.651 
MINERAL OR CHEMICAL FERTILIZERS.POTASSIC 4894.989 
BLOOMS,BILLETS,SLABS & SHEET BARS OF IRON OR STEEL 5313.213 
SHIPS,BOATS AND OTHER VESSELS FOR BREAKING UP 5870.671 
COPOLYMERS OF VINYL CHLORIDE AND VINYL ACETATE 18060.76 
EPOXIDE RESINS 18539.8 
ANTI-KNOCK PREPARATIONS,OXIDATION INHIBITORS ETC. 18641.68 
ROTARY PUMPS,OTHER THAN 742.81 18938.97 
BOOKBINDING MACHINERY AND PARTS 19031.01 
 
Table A.7 – Highest/Lowest products by PRODYA, High-Tech 
High-Tech Top-Bottom Products PRODYA 
FISSILE CHEMICAL ELEMENTS AND ISOTOPES 4856.107 
ELECTRICAL MACHINERY AND APPARATUS,N.E.S. 7726.411 
DIODES,TRANSISTORS AND SIM.SEMI-CONDUCTOR DEV. 8637.151 
TELEVISION RECEIVERS,MONOCHROME 8684.689 
TYPEWRITTERS;CHEQUE-WRITTING MACHINES 8822.92 
PHOTOGRAPHIC APPARATUS AND EQUIPMENT,N.E.S. 17276.33 
OTHER POWER GENERATING MACHINERY AND PARTS 17364.34 
INSTR.& APP.FOR PHYSICAL OR CHEMICAL ANALYSIS 17988.54 
COMPLETE DIGITAL CENTRAL PROCESSING UNITS 18061.49 
AIRCRAFT NOT EXCEEDING AN UNLADEN WEIGHT, 15000 KG 18250.7 
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Table A.8 - Sector sophistication and growth, by HDI rank, group 1 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
   Pooled-5 FE-5  Pooled-10 Fixed-10 
VARIABLES  gdpg5a gdpg5a gdpg10a gdpg10a  
    
lnhc15   0.00758 0.00202 0.00995* -0.00394 
   (0.00607) (0.0135) (0.00543) (0.0120) 
lngdpc   -0.0139*** -0.0309*** -0.0159*** -0.0308*** 
   (0.00369) (0.0101) (0.00327) (0.00773) 
lnPexpya  -0.00304** -0.00140 -0.00273* -0.000649 
   (0.00140) (0.00385) (0.00145) (0.00399) 
lnRBexpya  0.00124 -0.00101 0.00282 -0.00733 
   (0.00232) (0.00498) (0.00217) (0.00566) 
lnLTexpya  0.00386** 0.00452 0.00381** 0.00399 
   (0.00166) (0.00311) (0.00165) (0.00297) 
lnMTexpya  -0.000217 -0.00195 9.29e-05 -0.000928 
   (0.00213) (0.00373) (0.00241) (0.00445) 
lnHTexpya  0.000239 -7.97e-05 -0.000396 -0.00166 
   (0.00171) (0.00226) (0.00223) (0.00264) 
Constant  0.142*** 0.312*** 0.141*** 0.366*** 
   (0.0308) (0.109) (0.0299) (0.0930)  
Observations  402  402  225  225 
R-squared  0.270  0.257  0.326  0.375 
Countries    53    52 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table A.9 – Sector sophistication and growth, by income group, Group 1 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Pooled-5 FE-5   Pooled-10  FE-10 
VARIABLES  gdpg5a gdpg5a gdpg10a gdpg10a 
 
lnhc15   -0.00556 -0.0200 -0.00257 -0.0144 
(0.00792) (0.0162) (0.00699) (0.0150) 
lngdpc   -0.0306*** -0.0404** -0.0305*** -0.0316*** 
(0.00987) (0.0160) (0.00729) (0.0108) 
lnPexpya  -0.00141 3.46e-05 -0.000105 0.00278 
(0.00156) (0.00595) (0.00131) (0.00469) 
lnRBexpya  -0.00534* 0.00117 -0.00281 0.00174 
(0.00292) (0.00585) (0.00273) (0.00619) 
lnLTexpya  -0.00350 -0.00238 -0.000299 0.00144 
(0.00304) (0.00409) (0.00263) (0.00456) 
lnMTexpya  -0.00379 -0.00781 -0.00372 -0.00589 
(0.00345) (0.00634) (0.00303) (0.00550) 
lnHTexpya  0.00583*** 0.0140*** 0.00521** 0.0100*** 
(0.00213) (0.00317) (0.00220) (0.00265) 
Constant  0.405*** 0.435** 0.345*** 0.299*** 
(0.0900) (0.182) (0.0611) (0.107) 
Observations  173  173  97  97 
R-squared  0.519  0.499  0.633  0.608 
Countries    20    20 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.10 – Sector sophistication and growth, by income groups, Group 2  
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   Pooled-5  FE-5  Pooled-10 FE-10 
VARIABLES  gdpg5a gdpg5a gdpg10a gdpg10a  
     
lnhc15   -0.00276 -0.00602 -0.000169 -0.0141 
   (0.00608) (0.0129) (0.00594) (0.0135) 
lngdpc   -0.0155*** -0.0221* -0.0167*** -0.0300*** 
   (0.00408) (0.0114) (0.00358) (0.00969) 
lnPexpya  -0.00401** -0.000155 -0.00374* -0.000297 
   (0.00184) (0.00461) (0.00192) (0.00562) 
lnRBexpya  0.000501 0.00494 -0.000210 -0.0122 
   (0.00301) (0.00668) (0.00269) (0.00740) 
lnLTexpya  .00534*** 0.00742** 0.00422** 0.00395 
   (0.00197) (0.00333) (0.00211) (0.00339) 
lnMTexpya  0.00239 0.000108 0.00323 0.00519 
   (0.00239) (0.00436) (0.00269) (0.00492) 
lnHTexpya  -0.00134 -0.000719 -0.00159 -0.00160 
   (0.00185) (0.00257) (0.00251) (0.00343) 
Constant  0.161*** 0.159  0.177*** 0.365*** 
   (0.0452) (0.128) (0.0419) (0.117) 
Observations  260  260  145  145 
R-squared  0.317  0.281  0.367  0.406 
Countries    36    35 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table A.11 – Sector sophistication and growth, by income groups, Group 3 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Pooled-5 FE-5  Pooled-10 FE-10 
VARIABLES  gdpg5a gdpg5a gdpg10a gdpg10a  
 
lnhc15   0.00897** -0.0169 0.00583* -0.0233** 
   (0.00364) (0.0114) (0.00346) (0.0107) 
lngdpc   -0.00447 -0.00118 -0.00597 -0.0143** 
   (0.00553) (0.0138) (0.00393) (0.00556) 
lnPexpya  0.00432 0.00319 0.00103 -0.00506 
   (0.00420) (0.00889) (0.00272) (0.00434) 
lnRBexpya  0.00300 -0.000467 0.00384 0.00250 
   (0.00249) (0.00411) (0.00271) (0.00324) 
lnLTexpya  0.00647** 0.00629* 0.00435** 0.00287 
   (0.00266) (0.00338) (0.00171) (0.00245) 
lnMTexpya  -0.00473 -0.00276 -0.00145 0.000710 
   (0.00386) (0.00358) (0.00187) (0.00302) 
lnHTexpya  0.00290 0.00250 0.00185 0.00144 
   (0.00205) (0.00232) (0.00153) (0.00177) 
Constant  -0.00202 0.0103  0.0200  0.145** 
   (0.0611) (0.164) (0.0335) (0.0718) 
Observations  297  297  171  171 
R-squared  0.187  0.157  0.199  0.267 
Countries    51    51 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table A.12 -  Sector sophistication and growth, consistent countries only 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Pooled-5 FE-5  Pooled-10 FE-10 
VARIABLES  gdpg5a gdpg5a gdpg10a gdpg10a 
     
lnhc15   0.00954*** -0.00743 0.00739*** -0.00997** 
   (0.00251) (0.00573) (0.00254) (0.00507) 
lngdpc   -0.00896*** -0.0226*** -0.00773*** -0.0201*** 
   (0.00241) (0.00596) (0.00211) (0.00519) 
lnPexpya  -0.00192* -0.00342 -0.00137 -0.00107 
   (0.00113) (0.00294) (0.00131) (0.00248) 
lnRBexpya  0.00142 0.000330 0.00166 -0.00187 
   (0.00180) (0.00347) (0.00153) (0.00248) 
lnLTexpya  0.00249** 0.00217 0.00209* 0.00119 
   (0.00109) (0.00137) (0.00116) (0.00160) 
lnMTexpya  0.00136 0.00107 0.00218 0.00242 
   (0.00129) (0.00187) (0.00138) (0.00181) 
lnHTexpya  0.00160* 0.00291** 0.00110 0.00155 
   (0.000972) (0.00137) (0.000994) (0.00124) 
Constant  0.0794*** 0.224*** 0.0618*** 0.204*** 
   (0.0199) (0.0665) (0.0198) (0.0572)  
Observations  711  711  398  398 
R-squared  0.206  0.206  0.234  0.255 
Countries    83    83 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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APPENDIX B 
 
Figure B.1 - %Trade in primary/resource products and export sophistication 
 
Figure B.2 – Highest/lowest ranked countries by Resource-Based Sector 
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Figure B.3 – Top ten exports by value, Ireland, 2000 
 
 
Figure B.4 – Highest/lowest ranked countries by Low-Tech Sector 
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Figure B.5 – Top ten exports by value, Haiti, 2000 
 
 
Figure B.6 – Highest/lowest ranked countries by Med-Tech Sector 
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Figure B.7 – Top ten exports by value, Sierra Leone, 2000 
 
 
Figure B.8 – Highest/lowest ranked countries by High-Tech Sector 
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Figure B.9 – Top exports by value, Philippines, 2000 
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APPENDIX C 
1) Tests for stationarity of variables 
 
 
Figure C.1 – Average growth over time 
 
 
Figure C.2 – GDP/capita over time 
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Figure C.3 – Human capital over time 
 
 
 
Figure C.4 – Export sophistication over time 
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Figure C.5 – Primary sector sophistication over time 
 
 
 
Figure C.6  - Resource based sector sophistication over time 
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Figure C.7 – Low tech sector sophistication over time 
 
 
 
Figure C.8 – Medium tech sector sophistication over time 
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Figure C.9 – High tech sector sophistication over time 
 
Analysis – Overall it appears that our data is stationary in all variables over time. 
 
 
 
2) Test for multi-collinearity, aggregated model 
 
 
Table C.1 – Variance inflation factors, aggregated expy model 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
lngdpc 3.42 0.29265 
lnexpya 2.78 0.3591 
lnhc15 2.4 0.41723 
Mean VIF 2.87   
 
Analysis – Here we see that our variance inflation factors, which account for the 
amount of variation in each independent variable explained by the other 
independent variables, lies below 5 for each of our variables. This suggests 
that we have no problems with multi-collinearity. No correction is needed. 
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3) Test for heteroskedasticity, aggregated model 
 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of gdpg5a 
 
         chi2(1)      =     5.94 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0148 
 
 
Analysis – The Breusch-Pagan test computed using residual matrices gives a p-value 
of 0.0148. Therefore, we reject the null of homoskedasticity and perform 
our regressions using White’s robust standard errors to ensure consistent 
estimators. 
 
 
4) Test for normality, aggregated model 
 
 
Figure C.10 – Residual density plot 
 
Analysis-The graph above suggests that our residuals are not distributed perfectly 
normal. However, given our very large sample size, 858, we appeal to the 
central limit theorem, which assures us of the asymptotic normality of our 
estimators regardless of the normality of our residuals 
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5) Test for auto-correlation, aggregated model 
 
Table C.2 – Lagged residuals regression, aggregated model 
   (1) 
VARIABLES  e_1 
lnexpya  0.00300 
   (0.00443) 
lnhc15   0.00139 
   (0.00246) 
lngdpc   -0.00263 
   (0.00210) 
e_2   0.175*** 
   (0.0367) 
e_3   0.101** 
   (0.0420) 
e_4   -0.0419 
   (0.0511) 
e_5   0.109** 
   (0.0553) 
e_6   -0.0969 
   (0.0637) 
e_7   -0.0599 
   (0.0750) 
e_8   0.0926 
   (0.0975) 
e_9   -0.0234 
   (0.119) 
Constant  -0.00599 
   (0.0301) 
Observations  858 
R-squared  0.045 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Analysis – Using the Breusch-Godfrey test for autocorrelation we regress the residuals 
against all possible lags and the independent variables. Strong correlation 
suggests auto-correlation. Though we see that the first residual is 
significant, the test-statistic is R2*T, where t is the number of periods(9), 
distributed Chi-2(p) where p is the number of lags(8). Thus, we have a test-
statistic of (0.045*9)= 0.405 and critical value of 1.65. Conclusion: fail to 
reject null, no autocorrelation. 
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6) Test for normality, disaggregated model 
 
 
Figure C.11 – Residual density plot 
 
Analysis-Though not appearing perfectly normal, we again appeal to the central limit 
theorem due to our 730 observations, which assures us of the asymptotic 
normality of our estimators regardless of the normality of our residuals. 
 
 
7) Test for heteroskedasticity, disaggregated model 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of gdpg5a 
 
         chi2(1)      =    44.64 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
 
Analysis – With a p-value of 0.0000 we reject the null of homoskedasticity and 
perform our regressions using White’s robust standard errors to ensure 
consistent estimators. 
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8) Test for autocorrelation, disaggregated model 
 
Table C.3 – Lagged residual regression, disaggregated model 
   (1) 
VARIABLES  e_1 
lnhc15   -0.000666 
   (0.00242) 
lngdpc   3.40e-05 
   (0.00185) 
lnPexpya  -0.000214 
   (0.00121) 
lnRBexpya  4.49e-05 
   (0.00139) 
lnLTexpya  0.000102 
   (0.000950) 
lnMTexpya  0.000250 
   (0.00119) 
lnHTexpya  -0.000528 
   (0.000983) 
e_2   0.107*** 
   (0.0374) 
e_3   0.123*** 
   (0.0405) 
e_4   0.0666 
   (0.0437) 
e_5   0.0128 
   (0.0511) 
e_6   0.00561 
   (0.0577) 
e_7   -0.0194 
   (0.0665) 
e_8   0.122 
   (0.0993) 
e_9   0.0393 
   (0.139) 
Constant  0.00209 
   (0.0172) 
Observations  830 
R-squared  0.033 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
Analysis – Using the Breusch-Godfrey test for autocorrelation again the test-statistic is  
(0.033*9)= 0.297 and critical value of 1.65. Conclusion: fail to reject null, 
no autocorrelation. 
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9) Test for multi-collinearity, disaggregated model 
 
Table C.4 – Variance inflation factors, disaggregated model 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
lnMTexpya 3.68 0.271775 
lnHTexpya 3.18 0.314092 
lngdpc 2.9 0.345135 
lnhc15 2.47 0.404418 
lnLTexpya 2.32 0.430442 
lnRBexpya 1.33 0.750548 
lnPexpya 1.28 0.781538 
Mean VIF 2.45   
 
Analysis – Yet again our variance inflation factors all below 5 suggest that multi-
collinearity is not a problem for our regression analysis. 
 
 
10) Test for inclusion of time dummies, aggregated model 
 
test _Iyear_1965 _Iyear_1970 _Iyear_1975 _Iyear_1980 _Iyear_1985 _Iyear_1990 
_Iyear_1995 _Iyear_2000 
 
 ( 1)  _Iyear_1965 = 0 
 ( 2)  _Iyear_1970 = 0 
 ( 3)  _Iyear_1975 = 0 
 ( 4)  _Iyear_1980 = 0 
 ( 5)  _Iyear_1985 = 0 
 ( 6)  _Iyear_1990 = 0 
 ( 7)  _Iyear_1995 = 0 
 ( 8)  _Iyear_2000 = 0 
 
       F(  8,   846) =   16.28 
            Prob > F =    0.000 
 
Analysis – F-test rejects null that all coefficients on year dummies are zero, so we 
include them in our model specification. 
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11) Test for inclusion of quadratic terms, aggregated model 
Table C.5 – Information criterion for quadratic terms, aggregated model 
HC15 Adjusted R-squared BIC AIC 
Unrestricted 0.1403 -3327.82 -3389.63 
Restricted 0.1412 -3334.434 -3391.489 
    
EXPYA    
Unrestricted 0.1411 -3328.59 -3390.4 
Restricted 0.1522 -3334.434 -3391.489 
 
Analysis – All three measures of goodness of fit suggest that our model gains little 
explanatory power from the addition of either quadratic term. Thus, we 
conclude not to modify our model. 
 
 
12) Test for inclusion of interaction terms, aggregated model 
Table C.6 – Information criterion for interaction terms, aggregated model 
HC15 Adjusted R-squared BIC AIC 
Unrestricted 0.1400 -3321.759 -3388.323 
Restricted 0.1412 -3334.434 -3391.489 
    
GDP/C    
Unrestricted 0.1399 -3327.444 -3389.254 
Restricted 0.1522 -3334.434 -3391.489 
 
Analysis – All three measures of goodness of fit suggest that our model gains little 
explanatory power from the addition of the interaction terms. Thus, we 
conclude not to modify our model. 
 
13) Test for time dummies, disaggregated model 
 
test  _Iyear_1965 _Iyear_1970 _Iyear_1975 _Iyear_1980 _Iyear_1985 _Iyear_1990 
_Iyear_1995 _Iyear_2000 
 
 ( 1)  _Iyear_1965 = 0 
 ( 2)  _Iyear_1970 = 0 
 ( 3)  _Iyear_1975 = 0 
 ( 4)  _Iyear_1980 = 0 
 ( 5)  _Iyear_1985 = 0 
 ( 6)  _Iyear_1990 = 0 
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 ( 7)  _Iyear_1995 = 0 
 ( 8)  _Iyear_2000 = 0 
 
       F(  8,   814) =   17.17 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
Analysis – F-test rejects null that all coefficients on year dummies are zero, so we 
include them in our model specification. 
 
14) Test for inclusion of quadratic terms, disaggregated model 
 
HC15 Adjusted R-squared BIC AIC 
Unrestricted 0.1737 -3301.114 -3381.378 
Restricted 0.1746 -3307.683 -3383.226 
    
PEXPYA    
Unrestricted 0.1739 -3301.272 -3381.536 
Restricted 0.1746 -3307.683 -3383.226 
    
RBEXPYA    
Unrestricted 0.1737 -3301.039 -3381.303 
Restricted 0.1746 -3307.683 -3383.226 
    
LTEXPYA    
Unrestricted 0.1823 -3309.772 -3390.036 
Restricted 0.1746 -3307.683 -3383.226 
    
MTEXPYA    
Unrestricted 0.1744 -3301.826 -3382.09 
Restricted 0.1746 -3307.683 -3383.226 
    
HTEXPYA    
Unrestricted 0.1765 -3303.886 -3384.15 
Restricted 0.1746 -3307.683 -3383.226 
 
 
Analysis – Again, all three measures of goodness of fit suggest that our model gains 
little explanatory power from the addition of any of our quadratic terms. 
Thus, we conclude not to modify our model. 
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15) Test for inclusion of interaction terms, disaggregated model 
 
HC15 Adjusted R-squared BIC AIC 
Unrestricted 0.1900 -3283.392 -3391.984 
Restricted 0.1746 -3307.683 -3383.226 
    
GDP/C    
Unrestricted 0.1899 -3283.355 -3391.947 
Restricted 0.1746 -3307.683 -3383.226 
 
Analysis – Again, all three measures of goodness of fit suggest that our model gains 
little explanatory power from the addition of any of our interaction terms. 
Thus, we conclude not to modify our model. 
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